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Bala: Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka

Abstract
Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam came to a bloody end in May 2009, amidst allegations of war
crimes and crimes against humanity on both sides. Since then, Tamils in
the diaspora, long accused of funding the war, have become vocal
proponents for war crimes accountability. Some might label certain forms
of diaspora advocacy as “lawfare” or “long-distance nationalism.”
However, these labels fail to account for the complex memories and
identities that shape diaspora advocacy for accountability today. In order
for Sri Lanka to move forward from decades of conflict, transitional
justice mechanisms to seek truth, pursue justice, and provide redress will
need to address collective memories of violence. Inclusive transitional
justice mechanisms could incorporate a diaspora component to vindicate
the rights of diaspora Tamils as victims to truth and redress under
international law. Ultimately, opening the door to diverse narratives,
including competing narratives within the Tamil diaspora, could serve as
a starting point to come to terms with the past and explore hopes for a
shared future.
I.

Introduction

Accountability for mass violence is political, even for societies decades removed
from conflict.1 Political dimensions become more pronounced in a globalized world as
non-state actors increasingly lobby international organizations for accountability.
Conflict-generated diasporas, including Tamils, Irish, Kurds, Armenians, Liberians, and
others, are now able to serve as vocal transnational advocates, shaping post-conflict
transitional justice agendas. While these new roles may help broker peace, scholars have
also questioned whether conflict-generated diaspora groups, motivated by identity
politics, may play a destabilizing role.
This article takes a closer look at Tamil diaspora advocacy for war crimes
accountability in Sri Lanka to explore why certain diaspora voices for accountability
seem to diverge from international human rights organizations also pursuing
accountability. While some would conclude that certain diaspora actors engage in
“lawfare” or “long-distance nationalism,” this article argues that such assessments fail to
evaluate the complex memories, collective identities, and myths that shape diaspora
advocacy today. Rather than exclude diaspora Tamils with “separatist” views, it may be
worth considering whether their narratives could be incorporated within an inclusive
transitional justice framework. Truth commissions, commemorations, reparations, public
1

Case in point: the recent trial of General José Efraín Ríos Montt in Guatemala pitched those who insisted
that there had been genocide against those who denied it. Lisa J. Laplante, Memory Battles: Guatemala’s
Public Debates and the Genocide Trial of Jose Efrain Rios Montt, 32 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 621, 646 (2014).
The genocide-deniers (¡No hubo genocidio!) asserted that the Guatemalan government was fighting
“terrorist” guerillas in the early 1980s. Id. at 649-52. Their opponents (¡Sí, hubo genocidio!) cited
massacres of Mayan villages and military policy manuals as evidence of a government campaign to target
and eliminate Mayan civilians. Id. at 647-49.
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apologies, and prosecutions of historic crimes could serve to acknowledge the trauma and
legitimate grievances that led a quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils to seek refuge abroad.
While this effort is not without challenges, the Sri Lankan government could evaluate
creative approaches to acknowledge diverse diaspora memories of violence,
marginalization, and displacement as it comes to terms with its past.
This article is divided into six parts. Section II provides background on the postwar push for accountability in Sri Lanka, with an extended discussion of advocacy by
“hardline” diaspora Tamil groups before the UNHRC in March 2014. This section also
highlights diversity among diaspora groups in pursuing accountability. Section III asks
whether accountability lobbying by hardline groups should be interpreted as “lawfare” or
“long-distance nationalism.” Concluding that both of these labels dehumanize diaspora
experiences and fail to provide a path forward, Section IV argues that a deeper analysis is
necessary to understand the unique trauma and identities that shape diaspora Tamil
advocacy today. Section V outlines possibilities and challenges for incorporating
diaspora Tamil narratives into an inclusive transitional justice framework, exploring ways
in which diverse diaspora voices can be incorporated in mechanisms to seek truth,
provide redress, and pursue justice. Section VI concludes by suggesting that diaspora
engagement will be important for Sri Lanka to come to terms with the past, though such
an undertaking is not without challenges.
Without advocating a particular course of action, this article suggests that it may
be possible to develop an inclusive transitional justice framework that acknowledges
diverse narratives, including those advocating a “political” accountability agenda,
without whitewashing serious human rights violations by any one side of the conflict.
II.

Background

In May 2009, Sri Lankan government forces defeated the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE, sometimes called the “Tamil Tigers”), ending twenty-six years of
civil war. In the years since the war’s end, many diaspora Tamils, alongside human
rights organizations and several states, have advocated for war crimes accountability.
Citing a lack of domestic progress, accountability proponents called for an international
investigation of the last stages of the war. In March 2014, these calls were answered
when the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution creating a
U.N. inquiry to investigate crimes on both sides of the conflict.2
During UNHRC negotiations in Geneva, interesting divisions emerged among
those on the same side of the accountability debate. Some diaspora Tamils objected to
the resolution drafted by the United States and the United Kingdom. They argued that
addressing impunity and strengthening the rule of law island-wide, as the resolution
sought to do, would merely legitimize a racist Sri Lankan state without alleviating
problems faced by Tamils. Some diaspora Tamils sought a resolution that would
recognize claims to Tamil nationhood, while many human rights organizations and the
U.S. and U.K. distanced themselves from such views.

2

U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. 25/1, A/HRC/25/L.1/Rev.1, (Mar. 27, 2014).
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A.

Post-War Push for Accountability in Sri Lanka

In May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the LTTE,
framing the war as a “Humanitarian Operation” that followed a “zero-civilian casualty”
policy that aimed to “liberate” Tamils from the clutches of “terrorism.”3 The powerful
Rajapaksa clan4 maintained power for five-and-a-half years after the war ended, until
Maithripala Sirisena defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in presidential elections on January 8,
2015. During President Rajapaksa’s tenure, those who sought accountability or
questioned his administration’s narrative of the war were labeled “terrorists” or members
of the “LTTE rump.”5
The government’s defeat of the LTTE came at a tremendous human cost. In
March 2011, a Panel of Experts commissioned by the U.N. Secretary General found
credible allegations that both LTTE and government forces committed international
crimes during the final months of the war.6 Their report cited allegations that Sri Lankan
government forces “shelled on a large scale in three consecutive No Fire Zones where it
had encouraged the civilian population to congregate,” deprived humanitarian aid to
trapped civilians, summarily executed suspected LTTE members, and tortured and
harshly interrogated internally displaced persons in refugee camps. The Panel of Experts
also reported alleged atrocities by the LTTE, including forced conscription of children as
young as 14, locating military equipment in densely populated areas, and shooting
civilians who attempted escape. The report did not estimate casualties but suggested that

3

See, e.g., See, e.g., Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis July 2006-May 2009, Ministry of Defence
and Urban Development ¶ 9 (Jul. 31, 2011), available at http://slembassyusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/Sri-Lankan-Humanitarian-Operation-Factual-Analysis.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2014).
4
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, served as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.
Another brother, Basil Rajapaksa, served as Minister for Economic Development, overseeing all aspects of
post-war reconstruction in the north and east. A third brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, served as Speaker of
Parliament and Minister for Ports and Aviation. See, e.g., Infographics: Rajapaksa Family And Nepotism,
Colombo Telegraph, Mar. 20, 2013, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/infographic-rajapaksafamily-and-nepotism/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
5
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Opening Remarks at a Press Conference During
her Visit to Sri Lanka Colombo (Aug. 31, 2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13673&LangID=E (last visited
Oct. 19, 2014); The Sri Lankan Government retaliates to the proposed Human Rights Council resolution
by arresting activists and witnesses, Asian Human Rights Comm’n (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-045-2014 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
6
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri
Lanka, ¶ 258 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
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as many as 40,000 civilians may have died, mostly as a result of shelling by government
forces.7
The U.N.’s failure to step in or speak publicly about the violence in Sri Lanka in
2009 led to a complete rethink of U.N. policy during humanitarian crises. An
independent review panel concluded that the U.N.’s inaction in Sri Lanka reflected
“systemic failure.”8 The U.N. Secretary-General, with assistance from the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, responded by introducing the “Rights Up Front” plan
that prioritized human rights protection as a core purpose of all organs of the United
Nations.9 In presenting the Rights Up Front plan, the Deputy Secretary General noted
that systemic human rights violations often precede mass atrocities, and the challenges
faced by the U.N. in Sri Lanka in 2009 were not new.10
Having failed to step in and stop the bloodshed in 2009, the international
community pressed for credible investigations and accountability in subsequent years.
Human rights groups and civil society organizations pointed to Sri Lanka’s lack of
domestic progress in pursuing justice: No one has been held accountable for even the
most publicized and emblematic cases.11 In 2013, a commission on disappearances in the

7

The number of civilian casualties remains highly contested. A subsequent report to the U.N. Panel of
Experts Report suggested that as many as 70,000 civilians may have died in the final stages of the war. See
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel of United Nations Action
in Sri Lanka, ¶ 34 (Nov. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf
(“Petrie Report”) (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). By contrast, the Sri Lankan government, which initially
clung to a “zero civilian casualties” narrative, admitted in 2013 that some civilians died in the crossfire as a
result of wartime actions by the LTTE. See Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence, Full Report of the Army Board
on LLRC Observations, ¶¶ 57-61 (Jan. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.army.lk/docimages/image/LLRC_2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); see also Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (hereinafter, “LLRC Report) ¶ 4.112 (Nov.
2011), available at
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201112/FINAL%20LLRC%20REPORT.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“The Army too had returned fire, using small arms and during the exchanges of
fire, civilians were caught in the cross fire and casualties did occur.”).
8
Petrie Report, supra note 7.
9
The Secretary-General, Rights Up Front (May 2014), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/549141f84.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
10
Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, Press Conference on Rights up Front Action Plan (Dec. 19,
2013), http://www.un.org/sg/dsg/dsgoffthecuff.asp?nid=270 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
11
This includes the 2006 killings of five Tamil high school students in Trincomalee and seventeen aid
workers from Action Contre La Faim. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on advice and technical
assistance for the Government of Sri Lanka on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka,
¶¶ 33, 48-55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/23 (Feb. 24, 2013).
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North and East experienced witness tampering by government agents.12 A national
commission on torture was shelved one month after its announcement.13
Troublingly, credible allegations began to emerge of post-war human rights
abuses and international crimes against Tamils.14 Buddhist extremism against Sri
Lanka’s Muslim and Christian minorities also increased, punctuated by violent antiMuslim riots in four southern towns in June 2014.15 The international community
maintained that Sri Lanka’s shortcomings signaled broader failures of governance and
rule of law.16 In a 2014 report to the Human Rights Council, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that Sri Lanka’s lack of domestic progress could
“no longer be explained as a function of time or technical capacity” but rather was
“fundamentally a question of political will.”17
By contrast, the Rajapaksa administration maintained that international
accountability efforts were a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. The government harassed
and intimidated human rights advocates and victims.18 It purported to pursue a

12

See, e.g., Joint Civil Society Memorandum to the Human Rights Council and the International
Community, Centre for Policy Alternatives (Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://www.cpalanka.org/jointcivil-society-memorandum-to-the-human-rights-council-and-the-international-community/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2014).
13
Id. Responding to international pressure, President Rajapaksa expanded the mandate of the commission
in 2014 to investigate civilian deaths during the end of the war, but it remains unclear whether the
commission received such evidence or whether the change in government in 2015 has halted this
investigation. See Gazette No. 1871/18 (Jul. 15, 2014) (Sri Lanka) (expanding mandate of the
disappearances commission and appointing Sir Desmond de Silva, Sir Geoffrey Nice, and David Crane to
the newly formed Advisory Council); Gazette No. 1876/40 (Aug. 22, 2014) (Sri Lanka) (appointing
additional members Advash Kaushal and Ahmer Bilal Soofi to the Advisory Council).
14
An Unfinished War: Torture and Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka 2009-2014, The Bar Human Rights
Committee of England & Wales, and the International Truth & Justice Project, available at
http://www.stop-torture.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Crimes Against Humanity in Sri Lanka’s
Northern Province: A Legal Analysis of Post-War Human Rights Violations, Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace
& Justice (Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://www.srilankacampaign.org/about-us/library/ (last visited Apr.
2, 1015).
15
Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Stop the promotion of hatred and
faith-based violence, UN rights experts urge Sri Lanka (Jul. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14812&LangID=E (last visited
Oct. 19, 2014).
16
See A Crisis of Legitimacy: The Impeachment of Chief Justice Bandaranayake and the Erosion of the
Rule of Law in Sri Lanka, Int’l Bar Ass’n (Apr. 2013), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=C90B7A2F-5EE2-4E5B-BE6C-F7FCB9864E81
(last visited Oct. 19, 2014). Shirani Bandaranayake was reinstated to the Supreme Court on January 28,
2015, after Maithripala Sirisena’s defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa in January 2015 presidential elections. See
Sri Lanka reinstates Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake, BBC News, Jan. 28, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31021540 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). She retired immediately after
her reinstatement, her name having been cleared.
17
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/23, supra note 11, at ¶ 72.
18
Tamil Activist Detained in Sri Lanka, BBC News, Mar. 14, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia26577956 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
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homegrown ‘reconciliation through economic development’ strategy, investing in
infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka’s underdeveloped and Tamil-majority North.19
On March 27, 2014, the UNHRC passed a resolution, co-sponsored by the U.S.
and U.K., to promote reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka.20
This resolution was the third of its kind.21 The 2014 resolution was significantly stronger
than those in prior years because it established an international U.N. investigation into
alleged crimes by both sides to the conflict, whereas the 2012 and 2013 resolutions only
asked the Sri Lankan government to make greater domestic progress toward
accountability.22
B.

Accountability Advocacy by “Hardline” Diaspora Groups

In the weeks leading up to the March 2014 resolution, differences emerged
between different groups seeking accountability. Although Tamil diaspora organizations,
human rights groups, and many state actors supported an international investigation,
groups diverged on how to get there. Sri Lankan civil society organizations emphasized
the need to end systemic impunity and strengthen the rule of law, while some diaspora
groups advocated for accountability from the standpoint of state atrocities against Tamil
people as members of a “Tamil Nation.”23
The role of diaspora Tamils in funding the LTTE’s war for a “Tamil Eelam,” or
an independent Tamil state, is well documented.24 However, the connection between the
diaspora and the LTTE is complex and often misunderstood. There are Tamil diaspora
19

See, e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Oral Update of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka, delivered to the Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/CRP.3/Rev.1; Sri Lanka’s North II, Rebuilding Under the Military, Int’l
Crisis Group 2-3 (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/srilanka/220-sri-lankas-north-ii-rebuilding-under-the-military.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2015); Anonymous,
Against the Grain: Pursuing a Transitional Justice Agenda in Postwar Sri Lanka, Int’l J. Transitional
Justice 31, 31-32 (Feb. 17, 2011) (“The state appears to be working on the assumption that the economic
recovery combined with the reestablishment of subnational democratic institutions in the north and east of
the country will take care of all remaining minority grievances.”).
20
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 25/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/L.1.Rev.1 (Mar. 27, 2014).
21
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 19/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/2 (Apr. 3, 2012); U.N. Human
Rights Council Res. 22/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22.L.1/Rev.1 (Mar. 19, 2013).
22
See Res. 25/1, supra note 20 (Operative paragraph 10 calls on the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights to “undertake a comprehensive investigation” into human rights violations and crimes by
both sides to the Sri Lankan conflict and “monitor” and “continue to assess” the human rights situation and
domestic processes.”). The OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) interpreted its mandate to cover
abuses that occurred from 2002 to November 2011.
23
See, e.g., Dormant diaspora rises up against US draft, demands genocide investigation, plebiscite,
TamilNet, Mar. 10, 2014, http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37091 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
24
See, e.g., The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, Int’l Crisis Group i (Feb. 23, 2010), available
at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-afterthe-ltte.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); see also Peter Chalk, The Tiger’s Abroad: How the LTTE
Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka, 9 Geo. J. Int’l Aff. 97, 101 (2008); Funding the “Final
War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, Human Rights Watch (Mar. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/03/14/funding-final-war-2 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
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organizations all over the world, and diaspora Tamils hold diverse political views. As the
International Crisis Group notes, “[n]ot every diaspora Tamil donated funds to the Tigers,
not everyone supported them politically, and countless people were their victims.”25
Likewise, those who support “Tamil Eelam” do not necessarily support the LTTE or
advocate the use of violence. Still, an apparent divide emerged in March 2014 between
human rights groups and certain diaspora groups, despite their shared accountability goal.
On March 20, 2014, a few diaspora Tamils and “hardline” Tamil politicians from
Sri Lanka held a press conference at the Geneva Press Club titled, “Is the Sri Lanka
resolution at the UNHRC part of the problem or part of the solution?”26 Diaspora
members and certain politicians from Tamil parties in Sri Lanka criticized the draft U.S.
and U.K. resolution on grounds that it failed to recognize Eelam Tamils’ claims to
sovereignty.27 While citing a 66-year genocide of Tamil peoples, the speakers rejected
grievances of other minorities, thus seeming to whitewash the LTTE’s ethnic cleansing of
Muslims from the North and massacres in the East in the 1990s. The views expressed
seemed unapologetically separatist (in favor of Tamil Eelam) and in some cases, proLTTE. Recounting Sri Lanka’s past, one diaspora speaker stated that the LTTE became
the “sole representative” of the Tamil people.28 Throughout the three weeks of UNHRC

25

The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, supra note 24, at 4.
Press Conference, Is the Sri Lanka resolution at the UNHRC part of the problem or part of the solution?
(hereinafter, “Geneva Press Club meeting”) (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcegKPYr1LM (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
27
The speakers at the press conference criticized the U.S. and U.K.’s draft resolution on Sri Lanka, arguing
that any resolution that worked to legitimize the Sri Lankan state would not improve ground realities for
Tamils in Sri Lanka. The speakers stated that by singling out human rights abuses against religious
minorities without using the word “Tamil,” the draft resolution whitewashed a six-decade structural
genocide against Tamils in Sri Lanka. To those who spoke, any UNHRC resolution, including one that
called for an international commission of inquiry, would not bring about accountability or reconciliation
because it would be premised on the functioning of a racist Sinhalese state. Id.; see also UNHRC
resolution with weak mandate will not help Tamils, says Gajendrakumar, TamilNet, Mar. 24, 2014,
http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37131 (last visited Feb. 24, 2015); Guruparan addresses deTamilization, dichotomization in Geneva narrative, TamilNet, Mar. 25, 2014,
http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37132 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Activists from homeland,
diaspora address UNHRC, TamilNet, Mar. 25, 2014, http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37134
(last visited Feb. 24, 2015). One speaker explained that the draft resolution distorted relevant issues by
framing Sri Lanka’s problems as human rights violations or religious problems. Geneva Press Club
meeting, supra note 26. Such issues could be solved through increased democracy, he explained, whereas
Tamil survival and nationhood could not. The speaker asserted that true peace and regional security
required addressing Tamils’ rights to nationhood, homeland, and self-determination. Although he did not
advocate a return to violence, he told the audience that the LTTE took to arms because of systematic
problems that continue to present. Id.; see also Krisna Saravanamuttu, The UNHRC Resolution: A Critical
Interrogation, http://tamilyouth.ca/the-unhrc-resolution-a-critical-interrogation/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015)
(“Human rights problems can be rectified in a more liberal-democratic Sri Lanka…. But, human rights law
cannot deal with the structural nature of Sri Lanka that privileges the Sinhala nation to violently subjugate
the Tamils.”).
28
Geneva Press Club meeting, supra note 26.
26
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sessions in March 2014, LTTE sympathizers among the Tamil diaspora held large public
rallies waving hundreds of Tiger flags.29
The differences that emerged in Geneva in March 2014 between human rights
groups and certain diaspora Tamil organizations raised broader questions about the role
of diaspora advocacy for accountability. Framing differences with the Sri Lankan
government were to be expected, given the Rajapaksa administration’s labeling of the
war as a “Humanitarian Operation” to defeat “terrorism” and its outright hostility to war
crimes accountability. However, what emerged in Geneva were differences between
those supposedly on the same side of the accountability debate. A human rights group
could profess to be neutral on the question of separate statehood for Sri Lanka’s Tamils.
However, by supporting a resolution that aimed to strengthen the rule of law throughout
the island nation, these groups implicitly supported the territorial integrity of the Sri
Lankan state.30
Many human rights groups maintain distance from pro-Tiger and pro-Eelam
diaspora groups and caution them to moderate their tone.31 Some distance may be
understandable, given the Tamil diaspora’s role in funding the war. Many human rights
and civil society organizations express deep discomfort with affiliating with groups
linked to the LTTE and want to avoid any appearance of whitewashing LTTE crimes,
which included suicide bombings, disappearances, child conscription, ethnic cleansing,
and targeted killings. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in
particular may feel concern that they would compromise their commitment to other
human rights causes in partnering with perceived ‘radicalized’ diaspora Tamils.32
From a strategic standpoint, certain forms of diaspora advocacy, such as “proEelam” advocacy, may also make the “pitch” for accountability harder for human rights
groups and “pragmatic” diaspora groups committed to a united Sri Lanka.33 Human
rights groups, civil society organizations, and more moderate diaspora groups may
29

See, e.g., Dormant diaspora rises up against US draft, supra note 23.
Sri Lanka expert Alan Keenan makes a similar point: “imposing a balanced framework on a conflict that
is certain to be unbalanced in multiple and incommensurable ways threatens to impose a particular vision
of what the conflict is about and what its settlement should look like, precisely those issues that should be
open for debate and discussion by all parties.” See Alan Keenan, The Trouble with Even-handedness: On
the Politics of Human Rights and Peace Advocacy in Sri Lanka, in Nongovernment Politics, 88-117 (M.
Fehner ed. 2007). State actors like the United States are less conflicted: they “do[] not endorse the
establishment of another independent state on the island.” K. Alan Kronstadt and Bruce Vaughn, Sri
Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service 14 (Jun. 4, 2009), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125940.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
31
Author’s conversations with researchers at international NGOs; The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the
LTTE, supra note 24, at i (“[U]ntil it moves on from its separatist, pro-LTTE ideology, the diaspora is
unlikely to play a useful role in supporting a just and sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.”).
32
For example, Amnesty International faced a very public controversy in choosing to partner with former
Guantanamo inmate Moazzam Begg, a U.K. citizen with alleged Taliban ties. Diana Hortsch, The
Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, Responsible Advocacy, and NGO Accountability, 42
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 119, 155 (2010).
33
Some have privately remarked that diaspora advocacy in Geneva may have influenced certain countries
to vote against the 2014 UNHRC resolution or abstain from voting. Author’s interview with anonymous
(April 29, 2014).
30
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choose to keep a distance from groups that espouse separatism because they believe that
such advocacy will not strategically help their push for accountability. These concerns
merit consideration and are discussed in Section II.C.
However, alienating pro-Tiger and pro-Eelam groups may not be the best
approach. Over the past few years, some diaspora Tamil groups have become more
strident in their protests, advocating for a framing of the ethnic conflict as “genocide,”
arguing for recognition of Tamil nationhood, and waving LTTE flags before the U.N. and
government capitals.34 These voices have grown louder and more organized over the past
few years and are unlikely to dissipate entirely with the change in government or other
new developments. To the extent that these Tamils are viewed as “spoilers” to the
accountability process, it may be more effective to engage than to ignore.
From a less cynical perspective, the growing magnitude of these protests and the
disconnect in messaging may suggest that some diaspora Tamils feel marginalized and
disillusioned with the broader push for accountability.35 As one diaspora writer stated:
A section of the International Community once saw the LTTE as the
problem to resolving the conflict, believing the Sri Lanka state that
elimination of the LTTE would create a space for a political solution and
national reconciliation. However, evolving developments are clear
evidence that past assumptions were incorrect. The same section of the
International Community and the Sri Lankan state now see the Tamil
Diaspora as trouble-makers.36
In light of the apparent distance between human rights groups and certain “hardline”
diaspora groups in the push for accountability, the bulk of this article aims to take a step
back to understand why certain diaspora voices for accountability seem to diverge from
the “mainstream” and whether divergent narratives can nevertheless be included in Sri
Lanka’s transitional justice framework.
C.

Competing Diaspora Advocacy for Accountability

Not all diaspora Tamils shared the views of the Geneva Press Club speakers.
There were, and continue to be, deep divisions between diaspora groups engaged in

34

See, e.g., Oliver Walton, Framing disputes and organizational legitimation: UK-based Sri Lankan Tamil
diaspora groups’ use of the ‘genocide’ frame since 2009, Ethnic & Racial Studies, 1 (2014) (arguing that
while at first pass the increasing use of the ‘genocide’ frame appears counterproductive in bolstering
international legitimacy, its use may serve complex goals, including demonstrating independence from
international agendas by replacing frames of reconciliation, war crimes, and crimes against humanity with
frames of self-determination, statehood, and genocide).
35
One speaker at the Geneva Press Club meeting stated his view that Western countries and international
NGOs had silenced pro-Eelam groups in Geneva, thereby denying Tamils a voice in their own affairs just
as the Sri Lankan government had done for decades. Geneva Press Club meeting, supra note 26.
36
Nirmanusan Balasundaram, Is the Tamil Diaspora Against Unity in Sri Lanka?, Groundviews, May 4,
2013, http://groundviews.org/2013/05/04/is-the-tamil-diaspora-against-unity-in-sri-lanka/ (last visited Oct.
21, 2014).
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accountability advocacy. This section highlights some of those differences to emphasize
the diversity among diaspora groups seeking accountability.
In early March 2014, the U.S. and U.K. released their first draft of the UNHRC
resolution. Diaspora groups uniformly criticized the draft on grounds that it fell short of
creating an international commission of inquiry.37 Shortly after, the U.S. and U.K.
released a second draft, clarifying the U.N.’s investigative mandate. Some diaspora
groups welcomed the revisions, stating that it addressed prior concerns. Others, however,
continued to express disappointment. The divergent responses to the revised draft typify
the deep divisions and ideological battles between competing diaspora groups.

37

See, e.g., Strong calls for international investigation on first day of HRC session, Tamil Guardian, Mar.
3, 2014, http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=10130 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (citing
positions of Tamils Against Genocide, Canadian Tamil Congress, British Tamils Forum, and US Tamil
Political Action Council).
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For example, Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and British Tamils Forum (BTF)
both criticized the first draft, but CTC, unlike BTF, welcomed the revised second draft:

Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC)

British Tamils Forum (BTF)

First
Draft

“[A] proposed draft of a new
resolution on Sri Lanka, revealed on
Monday, fails to offer any
meaningful progress towards
accountability, let alone
reconciliation. The proposed
resolution effectively mutes the
chorus of calls for an International
Commission of Inquiry, and instead
continues to give Sri Lanka time and
space. The proposal appears to seek
the High Commissioner’s assistance
in undertaking an investigation,
however, it does not give her the
mandate, resources, or direction to
investigate and make a legal finding
of fact.”38

“The insubstantial draft resolution on
Sri Lanka that was released yesterday
at the United Nations Human Rights
council (UNHRC) has greatly
disappointed and shocked the Tamil
people, who are the primary victims of
the ongoing conflict in the Island of Sri
Lanka. The resolution text effectively
calls for more of the same: it requests
another update by the Human Rights
Commissioner in a year’s time and
makes another call on Sri Lanka to
launch a credible domestic inquiry –
despite the Human Rights
Commissioner herself declaring that
Sri Lanka has no political will to
investigate itself.”39

Second
Draft

“United Nations Human Rights
Council draft resolution 25/1
(revised), if adopted, would finally
serve as a meaningful step towards
accountability and justice in Sri
Lanka, in line with recommendations
by many previous UN bodies. The
clarification and strengthened
language in the latest revision
addresses many of the concerns
previously raised by the Canadian
Tamil Congress (CTC).”40

“As far as Tamils are concerned, the
resolution in its current form has a
number of serious defects. It fails to
recognise the ethnocratic dimension of
the conflict in the island of Sri
Lanka…. There is a common theme to
the draft resolution’s shortcomings; we
appeal to Member States to understand
the pattern behind the violence and
oppression – to perceive the underlying
theme of a structural genocide of the
Tamils.”41

38

Canadian Tamil Congress Press Release, New Resolution on Sri Lanka Falls Short: Time for UNHRC to
Take Decisive Action, Mar. 3, 2014,
http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=124 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
39
British Tamils Forum Press Release, Sri Lanka’s victims dismayed by draft resolution at UNHRC, Mar.
4, 2014, http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2014/03/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-victims-dismayed-by-draft-resolutionat-unhrc/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
40
Canadian Tamil Congress Press Release, Canadian Tamil Congress appreciates Revised Draft
Resolution on Promoting reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka, Mar. 17, 2014,
http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=125 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
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In recent years, some groups, such as CTC and Australian Tamil Congress (ATC)
have opted for what seems to be a pragmatic approach, welcoming incremental
international progress toward accountability and using caution with words like “Eelam”
or “genocide.” Others, such as the BTF, International Council of Eelam Tamils (ICET),
and the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) have opted for what I will
call a more hardline stance (or a more principled one, depending on perspective).42 Deep
fissures between diaspora Tamil groups post-2009 “reflect[] different strands of thinking
and ideology.”43 To further complicate the analysis, approaches to accountability can
also evolve over time within a diaspora organization.44
Ideological differences extend beyond accountability advocacy. In January 2015,
as voters turned to the polls in Sri Lanka, the Tamil National Alliance, the major Tamil
party, decided to support opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena over Mahinda
Rajapaksa.45 ICET argued that regime change would do nothing for “Eelam Tamils,” as
“[t]he continuing genocide of the Tamil Nation is the direct consequence of the antiTamil stance of the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony.”46 BTF stated that Sirisena’s victory
“will not still resolve the immediate issues faced by the Tamil people nor address the
fundamental issue that has affected the Tamils in Sri Lanka for a very long time.”47
TGTE’s leader stated that Sirisena’s victory “enabled only a face change such that the
very same [Sinhala-Buddhist] chauvinist structure could reassert itself further.”48
By contrast, CTC welcomed the election results, stating: “Mr. Sirisena’s election
marks the end of a decade-long dynastic dictatorship of the Rajapakse family, and hails

41

British Tamils Forum Press Release, BTF welcomes explicit call for investigation but proposed
resolution still has far to go, Mar. 18, 2014, http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2014/03/btf-welcomes-explicit-callfor-investigation-but-proposed-resolution-still-has-far-to-go/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
42
See, e.g., Walton, supra note 34, at 8 (“GTF, for example, has not used the term [genocide] frequently
based on the calculation that using the term might undermine their access at the UN.”); Samuel Oakford,
Genocide Replaces Separatism in Tamil Diaspora Vocabulary, Inter Press Service, Oct. 26, 2013,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/10/genocide-replaces-separatism-in-tamil-diaspora-vocabulary/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2015) (contrasting “tone” of CTC’s advocacy with that of TGTE).
43
Cathrine Brun and Nicholas Van Hear, Between the local and the diasporic: the shifting centre of gravity
in war-torn Sri Lankan transnational politics, 20 Contemporary South Asia 61, 70 (2012).
44
For example, the BTF “largely avoided using the term ‘genocide’ in press releases, until 2012, when it
began to use the term frequently.” Walton, supra note 34, at 9.
45
See, e.g., TNA Supports Maithri: Full Statement Issued By The TNA, Colombo Telegraph, Dec. 30, 2014,
http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tna-supports-maithri/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
46
Sri Ranjan, Neither Mahinda Nor Maithri Is Fit To Be The Choice Of Ealam Tamils: ICET, Colombo
Telegraph, Jan. 1, 2015, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/neither-mahinda-nor-maithri-is-fitto-be-the-choice-of-ealam-tamils-icet/comment-page-1/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
47
British Tamils Forum Press Release, British Tamil Forum response to the election results and the new
government in Sri Lanka, Jan. 9, 2015, http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2015/01/british-tamil-forum-response-tothe-election-results-and-the-new-government-in-sri-lanka/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
48
Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, Tamil Votes Amounted Not An Endorsement of Sirisena, Colombo
Telegraph, Jan. 21, 2015, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tamil-votes-amounted-not-anendorsement-of-sirisena/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
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the possibility and hope for a new democratic era.”49 Global Tamil Forum expressed
“hope that the new administration will engage the Diaspora in good faith and in a
meaningful way.”50
As this discussion shows, diaspora Tamil advocacy is not monolithic. Different
groups strongly disagree on how to frame calls for accountability and chart the
appropriate political course for Tamils in Sri Lanka. These differences have persisted
since 2009, and there is no reason to believe they will ease as Sri Lanka moves forward.
The Sirisena administration and the international community may find it easier to
engage with some diaspora groups over others.51 There may be greater room to engage
with groups like CTC than with groups like ICET in making incremental progress toward
accountability, insofar as international will for a U.N. Security Council referral to the
International Criminal Court or appetite for an independent Tamil Eelam are lacking.
However, this article avoids mapping capacities for strategic engagement across diaspora
groups, choosing instead to explore possible ways to include diverse diaspora narratives
within an inclusive transitional justice framework for Sri Lanka. As discussed in Section
V, diaspora Tamils, whether hardline or pragmatic, may have a stake as victims in
transitional justice mechanisms that seek truth, pursue justice, and provide redress.
III.

Diaspora Accountability Advocacy: “Lawfare” or “Long-Distance
Nationalism”?

Recently, legal scholars have started to ask whether the political use of
international humanitarian law results in illegitimate “lawfare,” or the use of law as a tool
of war. Likewise, some political science and international relations scholars focus on
whether conflict-generated diasporas behave as peace-promoters or peace-wreckers. As
discussed below, both analyses fall short. Diaspora Tamils have pushed for justice in Sri
Lanka for decades, and they will continue to do so regardless of whether they are viewed
as engaging in lawfare or peace-wrecking behavior. The real question, discussed in
Sections IV and V, is how to understand the motivations behind diaspora advocacy and
whether diverse diaspora narratives can be incorporated in an inclusive transitional
justice framework.

49

Canadian Tamil Congress Press Release, Canadian Tamil Congress Congratulates Maitrhipala Sirisena,
Jan. 9, 2015, http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=154 (last visited Feb.
23, 2015).
50
Global Tamil Forum Press Release, GTF eager for talks between new SL government and Tamil
Diaspora groups, Jan. 11, 2015, http://www.globaltamilforum.org/media/news/gtf-eager-for-talksbetween-new-sl-government-and-tamil-diaspora-groups-gtf-eager-for-talks-between-new-sl-governmentand-tamil-diaspora-groups.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
51
The International Crisis Group suggests that Sri Lanka and other governments “should do their best to
support moderate, non-separatist voices within the diaspora.” The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the
LTTE, supra note 24, at 24. A U.S. government cable likewise recognized that the diaspora Tamil
community was not “homogeneous” and recommended “a redoubled effort to reach out to Tamil groups in
the U.S.” See Classified Cable from Ambassador Blake, Sri Lanka, Engaging the Tamil Diaspora,
Wikileaks, Mar. 20, 2009, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09COLOMBO314_a.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2015).
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A.

Lawfare?

Lawfare has become a buzzword. Though its meaning is contested, it is
commonly used to refer to the “strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for
traditional means to achieve an operational objective.”52 The term was coined in 2001
by American military lawyer Charles Dunlap, who argued that “the use of law as a
weapon of war is the [newest] feature of twenty-first century combat.”53
Proponents of the lawfare critique argue that the use of lawfare is “illegitimate
and untenable” to the extent it risks politicizing and undermining respect for international
law.54 Opponents argue that the lawfare critique misses the mark and impermissibly
seeks to limit or stigmatize the pursuit of legal recourse, particularly through international
law.55 For example, military lawyer Gregory Noone argues that “[a]lthough there are real
and important harms that can be caused by those who abuse the law and have no interest
in justice, the harm would be greater if access to the courts is limited.”56 The lawfare
critique is criticized for “fail[ing] to recognize that the central purpose of any legal
system is to offer a viable alternative to the use of force.” 57 Indeed, Dunlap himself
suggests that “rather than warring over semantics, we should enthusiastically embrace the
52

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 Yale J. Int’l Aff. 146, 156 (2008).
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century
Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard U., Working Paper,
2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%
20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). Commonly cited examples of lawfare include: Bush
Administration officials accusing private attorneys representing Guantanamo inmates of engaging in
“lawfare.” Scott Horton, The Dangers of Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 163 (2010); Israel’s
defenders criticizing The Goldstone Report on Israeli military action in Gaza from 2008-2009 as “lawfare.”
Michael Newton, Illustrating Illegitimate Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 255 (2010); critics
claiming Serbia engaged in “lawfare” by filing suit before the International Court of Justice challenging
Kosovo’s declaration of independence following Serbia’s military defeat. Paul R. Williams, Lawfare: A
War Worth Fighting, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 145, 149 (2010); and Israeli and Palestinian attempts to
document war crimes by the other side after the 2014 Gaza War, again prompting cries of “lawfare.” See,
e.g., Kevin Connolly, Israeli-Palestinian conflict: How ‘lawfare’ has become a weapon, BBC News, Oct.
8, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29423784 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
54
Newton, supra note 53, at 255 (“Illegitimate exploitation of the law in turn permits the legal structure to
be portrayed as a mass of indeterminate subjectivity that is nothing more than another weapon in the moral
domain of conflict at the behest of the side with the best cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant
media accomplices.”).
55
William J. Aceves, Litigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict in U.S. Courts: Critiquing the Lawfare Critique,
43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 313, 318 (2010); William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone, and Lawfare, 43
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 307, 308-09 (2010); Gregory P. Noone, Lawfare or Strategic Communications?,
43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 73, 75-76 (2010); see also Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat:
Lawfare and the Campaign against Human Rights NGOs, 48 Law & Soc’y Rev. 311, 313 (2014) (“The
construction of human rights as a security threat, it should be emphasized, is carried out not in order to
reject human rights tout court, but in order to curb what neoconservative groups define as a particular
‘political’ application of human rights.”).
56
Noone, supra note 55, at 85.
57
Aceves, supra note 55, at 318.
53
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extent to which lawfare may facilitate courtroom combat replacing conventional combat
as the situs of many 21st century conflicts.”58
Applied to the Sri Lankan context, accountability efforts by some diaspora Tamils
could be viewed as “lawfare” to the extent these efforts are grounded in the pursuit for a
separatist Tamil homeland. For example, attempts by some diaspora members to ignore
or minimize human rights abuses faced by other minorities in Sri Lanka—or to oppose
solutions that would strengthen the rule of law throughout Sri Lanka—could be seen as
acts of lawfare through U.N. mechanisms.
Although human rights groups have yet to apply the “lawfare” label, some human
rights advocates have made similar types of arguments about diaspora accountability
advocacy. In a paper titled, “War by Other Means?” Richard Gowing argued that despite
employing the universal language of human rights, the rhetoric used by some
accountability advocates in the Tamil diaspora reveals an underlying political agenda.59
Similarly, the International Crisis Group stated that post-war “diaspora initiatives attempt
to carry forward the struggle for an independent state in more transparent and democratic
ways, but they are still pursuing the LTTE’s agenda, just without its guns.”60
The problem with this type of analysis is that it fails to suggest an appropriate
response. Assuming that certain diaspora Tamils engage in lawfare in pursuit of
accountability, responding with the “lawfare” label accomplishes little. Diaspora
activists will push for accountability for what they view as violations of international
criminal law whether or not their advocacy is deemed lawfare. As some practitioners
note, “lawfare exists and is used every day by both those seeking to achieve legitimate
ends and those seeking to achieve illegitimate ends,” and it would be “naïve” to fail to
adequately consider the political ramifications of international criminal justice.61
Moreover, accusing Tamil diaspora groups of lawfare is exactly what the
Rajapaksa administration did to tarnish international accountability efforts. The lawfare
critique is criticized for relying on the term as a code that connotes an entire argument for
conservatives (neoconservatives and right-wing ideologues, in particular) to stigmatize all
arguments drawn from international law, particularly as to those who represent alleged
terrorists.62 Former President Rajapaksa framed the decades-long ethnic conflict in Sri
Lanka as a “terrorism” problem, resolved by the government’s military defeat of the
Tigers in 2009. His administration branded diaspora accountability efforts as an attempt

58

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L., 142-43 (2010).
Richard Gowing, War by Other Means? An analysis of the contested terrain of transitional justice under
the ‘Victor’s Peace’ in Sri Lanka (London School of Economics Working Paper No. 13-138) 23-24, 31
(Jan. 2013) (also arguing that the Rajapaksa government’s constructed narrative of transitional justice
revealed a hidden political agenda). Note: This paper was published before Gowing joined Sri Lanka
Campaign for Peace and Justice as its Deputy Director and does not necessarily reflect the views of that
organization.
60
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, supra note 24.
61
Williams, supra note 53, at 145; David Crane, The Take Down: Case Studies Regarding “Lawfare” in
International Criminal Justice: The West African Experience, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 201, 212
(2011).
62
See Schabas, supra note 55, at 308-309; Noone, supra note 55, at 75-76; Horton, supra note 53.
59
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to achieve could not be obtained on the battlefield: an independent homeland for
Tamils.63
It is in this spirit that in March 2014, the Rajapaksa administration proscribed 16
Tamil diaspora organizations and 424 individuals as “terrorism” financers.64 This was
followed by a blanket ban barring all foreign passport holders from visiting the north.65
Then-Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa accused diaspora Tamils of misusing
tourist visas to engage in political activities, “projecting false propaganda on human right
violations.”66 Parliamentary discussion regarding the travel ban underscored the
administration’s narrative frame, in which diaspora Tamils were equated with Tiger
terrorists:
The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran [Tamil politician from the TNA party]:
“Why is the North being treated as a separate country?” is the question
that I am posing. People who come into this country can freely get about
anywhere else but not to the North. You have to get a special permit to go
to the North. […]
An Hon. Member: There can be LTTEers going to Jaffna.
The Hon.M.A. Sumanthiran: Where is the LTTE? I thought you destroyed
them fully.
An Hon. Member: A diaspora.67

63

See, e.g., Udeshi Amarasinghe, Modus Operandi: Tamil Diaspora and LTTE Organizations, Jun. 5,
2014,
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Modus_Operandi_Tamil_Diaspora_and_LTTE_Organisations_201
40605_05 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); TNA Says Un-Ban Ban, Apr. 30, 2014,
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=TNA_Says_UN_BAN_BAN_20140430_01 (government minister
declared Tamil National Alliance politicians, who form the majority in the Tamil-dominated North,
“terrorists” for calling on Sri Lanka to retract the ban on diaspora organizations).
64
Gazette No. 1854/41 (Mar. 21, 2014) (Sri Lanka), available at https://www.colombotelegraph.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/sl_banned_names.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). As peace activist Jehan Perera
writes, the Sri Lankan government takes a hard stance against the UNHRC war crimes investigation,
describing it as “an international conspiracy to punish the country’s leaders who defeated the LTTE and …
eventually seek the division of the country.” Jehan Perera, Shift In Priority From Ethno-Nationalism To
Good Governance, Colombo Telegraph, Oct. 20, 2014,
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/shift-in-priority-from-ethno-nationalism-to-goodgovernance/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
65
Prior approval for foreign nationals visiting the north, Ministry of Defence and Urban Development,
Oct. 16, 2014,
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Prior_approval_for_foreigners_visiting_the_North_20141016_02
(last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
66
Some tourists engage in politics, Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Jan. 4, 2014,
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Some_tourists_engage_in_politics_20140104_02 (last visited Jan.
25, 2015).
67
M.A. Sumanthiran, Tamils Were Not Fooled By Any Of The Roads, The Bridges, The Mega Projects
Govt Gave, Colombo Telegraph, Nov. 3, 2014, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tamilswere-not-fooled-by-any-of-the-roads-the-bridges-the-mega-projects-govt-gave/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
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The Rajapaksa administration declared the Tamil Diaspora as the new enemy in the
state’s war on terror. In September 2009, the Secretary to the Ministry of Defense stated
that allegations of war crimes by the diaspora constituted a threat “as serious as the one
posed by the LTTE.”68 In May 2010, military spokesperson Major General Samarasinghe
stated:
[W]e have won the war in Sri Lanka but internationally the second phase
of the war has started. Not only the forces, but the whole nation, including
the people living overseas must get together and stop this international
LTTE propaganda and activities. We will have to conduct a separate
operation on that which the government has already started.69
The Minister of External Affairs declared in 2010 that “boycott Sri Lanka” campaigns
were undertaken by “[diaspora] groups close to the LTTE, knowing very well that they
cannot unleash violence the way they did with impunity in the past.”70
It would be less than satisfying to adopt the Rajapaksa government’s framework
to further diminish and marginalize diaspora views. An Israeli scholar notes that
accusations by neoconservatives that “human rights work is lawfare” aims to silence and
obstruct this type of work.71 Moreover, some argue that applying a counter-terrorism
framework to diaspora Tamil advocacy effectively “negates the role of the Sri Lankan
state in establishing the conditions of conflict.”72 As discussed in Sections IV and V, an
inclusive transitional justice program for Sri Lanka may require a more nuanced
approach.

68

Sri Lanka targeted for defeating LTTE terror-Defence Sec., Sept. 18, 2009,
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200909/20090918sl_targeted_defeating_ltte_terror.
htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
69
Second phase of war begun, Daily Mirror, May 12, 2010, http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/3710-tigerpropaganda-crackdown.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
70
Minister Peiris refutes LTTE Propaganda in London, President Media Unit, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201010/20101021minister_peiris_refutes_ltte_prop
aganda_london.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014); see also Vicki Sentas, One more successful war? Tamil
diaspora and counter-terrorism after the LTTE, in Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The
‘War on Terror’ as Terror 97 (Scott Poynting and David Whyte, eds., 2012) (arguing that “terrorism”
framing on the part of the Sri Lankan government before and after the war masks state violence). Postregime change, the Sirisena administration appears to have softened the narrative, canceling the travel ban
for foreign passport holders; Venkat Narayan, Mangala promises demilitarisation of North, domestic war
crimes probe... calls upon TNA to join govt, The Island, Jan. 20, 2015,
http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=118038 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015); Sri Lanka Scraps Ban on Foreigners Visiting Northern Former War Zone, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/01/16/world/asia/16reuters-sri-lanka-northban.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). However, as of the time of this article, targeted bans on 424 diaspora
individuals and 16 organizations remain in place.
71
Gordon, supra note 55, at 318.
72
Sentas, supra note 70, at 107.
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B.

Long-Distance Nationalism?

There is a growing body of literature on the role of conflict-generated diasporas in
promoting peace or fueling conflict. The term “conflict-generated diasporas” refers to
groups, such as Tamils, “who have fled their country due to large-scale violence and
abuses.”73 At the risk of oversimplification, the bulk of literature in this genre evaluates
whether conflict-generated diasporas are good or bad actors by assessing whether they
help secure peace or prolong homeland conflict.74
A 2004 study by World Bank economists concluded that “a large diaspora
considerably increases the risk of repeat conflict.”75 Benedict Anderson coined the
phrase “long-distance nationalists” to characterize the role of conflict-generated diasporas
in prolonging homeland conflicts. He argued that diaspora groups pursue identity politics
and fuel exclusionary movements in their home countries because they do not have to
face the consequences—in effect, engaging in politics without accountability.76 This
analysis frames diaspora advocacy as “hate from a distance”77 by “distant warriors”78
who can take out their “frustrations and fantasies”79 without having to face political
consequences. Some scholars assert that diaspora politicking is motivated by “guilt of
departure” from leaving fellow compatriots behind in a war zone.80 Along the same vein,
a World Bank policy paper concluded that “diasporas tend to be more extreme than the
population remaining in the country of origin: supporting extremism is a simple way of
73

Huma Haider, Transnational Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: The Participation of ConflictGenerated Diasporas in Addressing the Legacies of Mass Violence, 27 J. of Refugee Studies 207, 211
(2014).
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See, e.g., Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, Diasporas and Conflict Resolution – Part of the Problem or Part of
the Solution? (Seminar on Diaspora and Conflict, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen,
Den.), Dec. 8, 2005, at 12, available at http://subweb.diis.dk/sw20879.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2014);
Steven Vertovec, Diasporas good? Diasporas bad? (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Univ. of
Oxford, Oxford, U.K.), 2006, available at
https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2006/WP0641Vertovec.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
75
Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler, Greed and Grievances in Civil War, 56 Oxford Economic Papers 563,
575 (2004).
76
Benedict Anderson, Long Distance Nationalism, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast
Asia and the World 58, 74 (Benedict Anderson ed. 1998) (“The participant rarely pays taxes in the country
in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not cast even an
absentee ballot in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he need not fear prison, torture, or
death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send
money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of
which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations.”).
77
Michael Ignatieff, The hate stops here, Globe & Mail, Oct. 25, 2001 at A17 (“Diaspora nationalism is a
dangerous phenomenon because it is easier to hate from a distance: You don't have to live with the
consequences—or the reprisals.”).
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Camilla Orjuela, Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s
Violent Conflict. 8 Global Networks 436, 441 (2008).
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Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era 1951 (2013); Anderson, supra
note 76, at 75.
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Ignatieff, supra note 77.
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asserting continued identity with the place that has been left.”81 Conflict-generated
diasporas, it is argued, may resist conflict resolution because homeland conflict may
sustain diaspora identities in a foreign land.82
By contrast, other studies note the potentially positive role that diaspora groups
can play in negotiating and maintaining peace after a period of conflict.83 Some note the
potential ability of diasporas “to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy” to their
home countries.84 Other studies conclude that conflict-generated diasporas support
violence in certain political circumstances in their home countries but promote peace in
other circumstances.85
In the context of Sri Lanka, diaspora Tamils are generally classified as peacewreckers with regard to their support for the LTTE.86 As one author concludes:
Since 2009, the Tamil diaspora community—those Tamils who fled the
country during the course of the war—have been, by all accounts,
absolutely instrumental in egging on remnants of the LTTE. From the
sidelines and with no stakes in the consequences, they spew ‘racist vitriol’
through avenues like TamilNet to encourage a rekindling of the war in the
pursuit of a Tamil homeland.87
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Paul Collier, et. al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: civil war and development policy, Volume 1, (World
Bank Research Report 74) (May 2003), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=544849&piPK=64165421
&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000094946_0306190405396 (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
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Yossi Shain, The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation and Resolution, 22 Sais Rev. 115, 129
(2002) (“Since the threat to the homeland is a powerful tool to mobilize diaspora community members to
fund diaspora organizations and engage in political activity in the host state, peace itself can threaten
diasporic identity.”); see also Ostergaard-Nielsen, supra note 74, at 12 (Diaspora Tamils, along with Irish,
Ethiopians, and Kurds, are “depicted as hardliners who are unwilling to accept compromises because the
conflict is of low cost to them and may have become an integral part of the exile identity.”).
83
Shain, supra note 82, at 126 (“Just as far-off diasporas play important roles in supporting violent
conflicts involving their homeland states, they may also play a critical role in conflict resolution.”); see also
Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts,
25 Int’l J. on World Peace 7 (2008).
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Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, Diasporas and International Relations Theory, 57 Int’l Org. 449, 450
(2003).
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See, e.g., Maria Koinova, Can conflict-generated diasporas be moderate actors during episodes of
contested sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian diasporas compared, 36 Rev. Of Int’l Studies 437 (2011);
Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser & Ashok Swain, Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and PeaceBuilding in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, 23 Studies In Conflict and Terrorism 681 (2009).
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Sarah Wayland, Nationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,
30 Rev. of Int’l Studies 405 (2004); Christine Fair, Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from
the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements, 11 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 125 (2005); Christine Fair,
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace, in Diasporas in Conflict,
Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? 172, 174 (Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., 2007).
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Other studies acknowledge diaspora Tamils as potential peace-promoters, particularly
with regard to their efforts in securing the 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE.88
In the post-war context, some have suggested a growing disconnect between
Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora on the issue of Tamil nationalism.89 It is argued
that post-war initiatives, such as ‘transnational’ diaspora organizations and referenda on
the question of Tamil Eelam, “had very little purchase among the Tamils in Sri Lanka
whose cause they claimed to espouse, underlining the apparently now large disconnect
between the Tamil diaspora and those back home.”90 Others disagree, noting that the
“dichotomy of ‘insider-outsider’ seldom exists in the self-conception of the diaspora,”
whose advocacy is driven both by the intransigence of the Sri Lankan state in addressing
Tamil grievances and “the physical threat faced by their friends and families on the
island.”91 As Vimalarajah and Cheran argue, “[t]o say that the Tamil Diaspora does not
have to carry the costs of its long-distance politics … trivializes the pain and trauma of
thousands of diaspora Tamils whose family members and relatives have perished in large
numbers in the last few months of the war.”92
Ultimately, theories of long-distance nationalism appear to place labels on
diaspora behavior in the same vein as the lawfare critique, by deciding whether diaspora
Tamils are peace-promoters, peace-wreckers, or something in between. These labels tend
to instrumentalize conflict-generated diasporas, suggesting that the international
community engage with these groups when they moderate their demands and keep a
distance when they do not. This may ultimately hamper conflict transformation:
Vimalarajah and Cheran assert that “[t]he classification of [diaspora] actors into extremist
or moderate, into good or bad and into legitimate or illegitimate will not only contribute
to a further polarization and marginalization but also close the door for any constructive
engagement toward any sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.”93
Diaspora Tamils have engaged in transnational advocacy long before 2009, and
advocacy continues among second- and third-generation Tamils post-war.94 Given this
fact, it may be more prudent to move past labels to assess why diaspora Tamil voices
88
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Luxshi Vimalarajah & R. Cheran, Empowering Diasporas: The Dynamics of Post-war Transnational
Tamil Politics (Berghof Conflict Research, Berlin, F.R.G.), 2010, at 16-17, available at
http://image.berghoffoundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Occasional_Papers/boc31eBP
S.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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Id. at 16.
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Id. at 34.
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See, e.g., Luxshi Vimalarajah, et al., Engaging Tamil Diaspora for Peace and Development: January
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differ and how they should be included within transitional justice processes.95 Section IV
explores collective histories and memories that shape diaspora Tamil advocacy, and
Section V explores various means by which the government of Sri Lanka could
incorporate a diaspora component into transitional justice mechanisms to seek truth,
provide redress, and pursue justice.
IV.

Unpacking Diaspora Calls for Justice

Shared memories and histories shape modern narratives. In the case of Sri
Lanka’s diaspora Tamils, collective memories of violence, marginalization, and impunity
shape current narratives for accountability, including among hardline diaspora groups.
A. Transitional Justice and Identity (Re)construction
In the 1980s, as Latin American dictatorships became democracies, the field of
transitional justice developed as a set of judicial processes to address human rights
violations during democratic transition from repressive regimes.96 Since then, the field
has expanded broadly to encompass a holistic set of approaches to help achieve
accountability, justice, and reconciliation following war crimes and massive human rights
abuses.97 The United Nations has incorporated transitional justice in its post-conflict
toolkit, defining it as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”98
Broadly speaking, transitional justice encompasses a justice process (to hold
perpetrators accountable), a reparation process (to redress victims), a truth process (to
95

Vimalarajah and Cheran make the same critique: “The inadequacies in both aforementioned strands of
thinking—diaspora as peace promoter or spoiler—partly result from a descriptive analysis of the diaspora.
We suggest looking at the Tamil diaspora from a different angle: not by what it is doing but by why it’s
doing what it is doing.” Vimalarajah & Cheran, supra note 91, at 17.
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See, e.g., Paige Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice, 31 Hum. Rts. Q. 321 (2009) (describing how transitions from authoritarian regimes
to democracy in countries like Argentina shaped initial rule of law and accountability approaches to
transitional justice methods); Martina Fischer, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and
Practice, in Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, 405, 407 (Beatrix Austin,
Martina Fischer, and Hans J. Gießmann, eds. 2011), available at http://www.berghofhandbook.net/documents/publications/fischer_tj_and_rec_handbook.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2014)
(describing evolution of transitional justice theory and practice).
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See generally, Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 69 (2003)
(describing three generations of transitional justice: “victor’s justice” at Nuremberg (phase I), 1980s/1990s
debates of truth versus justice and peace versus justice (phase II), and the mainstreaming of transitional
justice in post-conflict societies (phase III)); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing
History after Genocide and Mass Violence (1998) (exploring contours of restorative justice versus
retributive or punitive justice in the wake of mass atrocities).
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The Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Approach to
Transitional Justice, 3 (March 10, 2010), available at
http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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fully investigate what happened during the conflict and identify perpetrators and victims),
and an institutional reform process (to ensure that atrocities do not happen again). As
stated by the Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice, “[a]n appropriate post-conflict
justice strategy will reveal as much truth as possible; achieve as much reconciliation as is
feasible; provide as full and complete reparations as are affordable; and, address past
violence in an open, transparent, and truthful manner.”99
The field of transitional justice has recently started to consider “fourth generation
concerns,” including “the need to account for the underlying politics of transitional
justice work, the need to balance local and international agency, and the need for greater
economic justice.”100 One fourth-generation concern is how to address collective
identities in formulating transitional justice processes:
In order for [transnational justice] to deal adequately with the factors at
work in conflicts with an identity dimension, it must first acknowledge
and assess the relative weight of those factors in any particular context.
Concretely, this means taking stock of the role that fear of domination, a
pervasive sense of threat, ethnic entrepreneurs, dehumanizing myths and
narratives, etc., played in the past and continue to play in the present.101
Societies exposed to protracted violent conflict require more than the signing of a peace
treaty—they “also require adjustments at a more fundamental psychological level.”102 “A
generic inquiry that does not account for the varying experiences of specific sectors of the
population cannot appropriately recognize victims, fully understand the abuses and
violations that occurred, or make effective policy recommendations to prevent their
recurrence.”103 At a minimum, “much more contextual analysis is needed—of nationalist
99

Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (2008), at 10, available at
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myths, of the role of elites, and of fault lines of mistrust, among other things—than is
typically undertaken by transitional justice actors.”104 Put differently, reconciliation
requires deeper introspection into the memories, identities, myths, and collective
narratives that sustained the conflict.105
Applied to the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, it is vital to understand the context of
the ethnic conflict underlying Sri Lanka’s civil war, as diaspora Tamils view it, in order
to understand why present-day diaspora narratives may take a certain tone. Where the
long distance nationalism and lawfare analyses fall short is in failing to look at the
specific motivations underlying diaspora positions. In so doing, these approaches fail to
unearth the “experiences, vulnerability and hence the deprivation felt by those who live in
the diaspora because of conflict” and thus “marginalize[] the actual human being who is
the object of the study.”106
Sri Lanka’s post-war Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)
emphasized the need to “constructively engage those groups that still harbor adversarial
attitudes and the LTTE approach of separation,” recommending that the government
create
[a multi-disciplinary task force] to propose a programme of action to
harness the untapped potential of the expatriate community, and to
respond to the concerns of the so-called ‘hostile diaspora groups,’ and to
engage them constructively with the Government and other stakeholders
involved in the reconciliation process.107
104

Paige Arthur, Introduction: Identities in Transition, supra note 102, at 13.
Social psychology literature regarding trauma and violence suggests that transitional justice requires
individuals to transform their collective identity “by removing the negation of the other from it.” Herbert
Kelman, Reconciliation as identity change: A social-psychological perspective, in From Conflict
Resolution to Reconciliation 111, 119 (Y. Bar-Simon-Tov ed. 2004). As Robben and Orozco-Suarez
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Trauma 1 (Antonius C.G.M. Robben & Marcelo Suarez-Orozco eds., 2000). Drawing from social
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Transitional Justice and the Reconstruction of Identity, 47 Transcultural Psychiatry 33, 45 (2010).
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London School of Economics and Political Science), at 239, available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/460 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2015).
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The LLRC noted the urgency of diaspora engagement:
If such a comprehensive approach is not adopted urgently, the
Commission feels that the current momentum towards creating a hostile
external atmosphere could grow, and those groups that advocate such a
process would continue to promote polarization that will significantly
impair the genuine efforts of others who espouse reconciliation back home
in Sri Lanka.108
Scholars and commentators have echoed this call.109
A first step in understanding the motivations behind diaspora advocacy is to
investigate how diaspora Tamils view “the repercussions of exile on their lives, their
paths and their histories.”110 There is a need to move beyond the “single narrative” and
recognize diverse, if conflicting, stories.111 As Pragasam notes:
[R]ather than just essentializing diaspora opinion and support for bellicose
action based on functional ideas of coercion, hate or guilt, in a somewhat
instrumental, reductionist and opportunistic sense, it is necessary to
interrogate the existence and motivations of such communities within a
more subjective, political, and historicized context.112
The point of this inquiry is neither to elevate a diaspora Tamil narrative nor to subvert
other narratives—in the same way that diaspora Tamils must be given a chance to tell
their (diverse) stories, so too must Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese, Muslims, Christians, and other
groups. The goal instead is to explore how transitional justice processes will need to
work at the individual level for individuals to transition from decades of conflict.
constructively engage with the diaspora. Despite the change in government in January 2016 and some
overtures to diaspora communities, the Sirisena administration has not delisted the proscribed groups.
108
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109
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implications for domestic stability.”). Yusuf suggests that Sri Lanka create an Office of Diaspora Affairs to
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country’s plans and future.”
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wartime sexual violence and enforced disappearance in Latin America, asked the audience whether it is
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Ultimately, there may not be common ground among divergent actors on whether
genocide occurred or whether Tamil Eelam is the desired end-game. The truth-seeking
component of transitional justice may ultimately reflect competing truths. Still, without
recognizing the role of collective memories and identities in shaping present diaspora
narratives, it is unrealistic to expect groups to moderate their tone or to reconcile. Calls
for diaspora Tamils to condemn LTTE abuses or moderate their calls for Eelam113 may
require members of the diaspora to revisit their constructed identities—no easy task.114
B. Collective Memories and Identities Among Diaspora Tamils
Researcher Nirad Pragasam interviewed dozens of Sri Lankan Tamils in London
over the course of three years to understand their motivations and identity-perceptions.
He found that for many, “the Sri Lanka they have ‘left behind,’ a Sri Lanka that they
nonetheless ‘live within,’ is a place defined by the consequences of oppression, violence
and conflict, a conflict that they themselves still feel presently engaged in and hence, it is
a conflict that informs their sense of self on various levels.”115 Pragasam concluded that
collective identity among diaspora Tamils was not merely shaped by the trauma of the
past, but also by the present existentialist condition of being a member of the diaspora.116
Likewise, a survey of diaspora Tamils in the U.K. revealed that “rather than creating a
victim complex—although feelings of anger, grief, and frustration were mentioned—this
feeling of being an oppressed people assisted in strengthening the will to resist and led to
clear statements that to be ‘Tamil’ was to be ‘not Sri Lankan.’”117 Similarly, a health
worker treating Tamil asylum seekers in London observed that the Tamils’ suffering
continued after leaving Sri Lanka.118
Pragasam found that Tamils he met had become radicalized both as a result of
personal experiences of marginalization and victimization and as a result of frustration
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that moderate Tamil leaders could not protect Tamils in Sri Lanka.119 Pragasam found
that many he interviewed “viewed the LTTE as a necessary and acceptable evil in the
face of a history of oppression, discrimination, human rights abuses, and war crimes.”120
Sri Lanka at independence in 1948 was seen as a model for growth and
development in the region. The country experienced relative harmony among its ethnic
communities.121 Almost 70 years later, Sri Lanka is marked by bitter ethnic polarization,
increased authoritarianism, and diminished rule of law.122 This did not happen
overnight—instead, a series of ethnocentric policies by the majority Sinhalese
government were met with ruthless terrorism by the LTTE:
• Sinhala replaced English as the country’s sole official language in 1956, forcing
thousands of Tamils to resign from government service due to lack of fluency in
Sinhala. The 1972 Constitution further consolidated the ‘Sinhala Only’ policy,
removing provisions that protected minorities from discrimination.123
• Mass riots and state-sponsored pogroms targeting Tamil civilians occurred in
1956, 1958, 1977, and 1983, causing a mass exodus of Tamils from the island.
Nonviolent Tamil protests, including those led by Tamil politicians, were brutally
suppressed.124
• Successive Sri Lankan governments abrogated political agreements with Tamil
leaders, causing many Tamils to lose faith in the political process.125
• In the 1960s and 1970s, the government implemented standardization policies
and quotas, restricting university admissions for Tamils.126
• In 1979, the Sri Lankan government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
which allowed the police to arrest anyone suspected of terrorism for up to 18
months without charge. Many Tamils were arbitrarily detained under this
controversial law, which remains in effect today.
• In 1981, mobs burned the Jaffna Public Library, which housed rare Tamil
manuscripts and held a place of cultural significance for the local Tamil
community.127
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A.R.M. Imitiyaz, Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: The Dilemma of Building a Unitary State, in Conflict
and Peace in South Asia 125, 134 (Manas Chatterji & B.M. Jain eds., 2008); K.M. de Silva, Sri Lanka and
the Defeat of the LTTE (Kindle book), Ch. 7.
124
See, e.g., Imitiyaz, supra note 123, at 131-36.
125
Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake (SLFP Party) signed a pact with Tamil leader S.J.V.
Chelvanayakam in 1957 but abrogated it in 1958. Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake (UNP Party) signed
a pact with Chelvanayakam in 1965, but Tamil parties withdrew support in 1969 after the government
failed to implement most of its provisions.
126
See, e.g., Devotta, supra note 121; Silva, supra note 123, at Ch. 6 (“For the Tamils, this district quota
system was a heavy blow: the percentage of university seats they held in the science-based disciplines fell
from 35.3 in 1970 to 20.9 in 1974, and 19 in 1975.”).
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See, e.g., Devotta, supra note 121.
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•

In July 1983, in response to the LTTE killing 13 soldiers, anti-Tamil riots broke
out throughout the island. The state did nothing to stop the looting and mayhem
over a seven-day period now referred to as “Black July,” in which upwards of
3,000 were killed and tens of thousands displaced.128 Two weeks before the riots,
President Jayawardene told press: “I am not worried about the opinion of Jaffna
people…now we cannot think of them, not about their lives or their opinion….
the more you put pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhala people will be
here…. Really if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhala people will be happy.”129

Jayawardene’s government did little in response to Black July, and waves of
refugees fled to Tamil-dominated areas of the north and east and to India, the U.K.,
Canada, and other countries.130 After the 1983 riots, Tamil militant groups (not limited to
the LTTE) suddenly swelled in recruits, as Tamils decided that the state would never
protect them. In response, the Sri Lankan government heavily militarized the north and
east, and there was virtual impunity for torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and
rape by Sri Lankan security forces.131
The LLRC concluded that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies
in the failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil
people.”132 As a consequence of their history, one quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils,
numbering over one million today, fled their country as refugees.133 History—both
personal and collective—shapes diaspora narratives:
For every major account of atrocity in the public consciousness of the
Tamil community, most Tamils also have a list of incidents ‘closer to
home,’ within their own towns and villages, where they themselves or
128

Sharika Thiranagama, In my Mother’s House: Civil War in Sri Lanka 80 (2011).
Suthaharan Nadarajah and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, 26 Third World Q. 87, 92 (2008) (citing Daily
Telegraph interview of J.R. Jayawardene, Jul. 11, 1983).
130
See, e.g., Remembering Sri Lanka’s Black July, BBC News, Jul. 22, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23402727 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
131
See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Report: Sri Lanka (1999), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/442.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (“Impunity remains a serious
problem. Since April 1995 at least 761 persons have been killed extrajudicially by the security forces or
have disappeared after being taken into security force custody and are presumed dead. With the exception
of the six security force personnel convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, no member
of the security forces has been convicted for any of these crimes. In the vast majority of cases where
military personnel may have committed human rights violations, the Government has not identified those
responsible and brought them to justice.”).
132
LLRC Report, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 8.150, 9.184; see id. at ¶ 9.191 (“The decisive rift in the inter-ethnic
relationship came first with the riots of 1958, then in 1977, and culminating in what is known as ‘Black
July’ of 1983, and the heinous failure of the then Government to provide adequate protection to Tamil
citizens.”).
133
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, supra note 24, at 2; Asoka Banderage, The Separatist
Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy 219 (2008); Thiranagama, supra note 128,
at 81 (describing the 1983 riots as “the cataclysmic event of the ethnic conflict,” which “comprehensively
transformed Tamil public support for newly emergent Tamil militancy”).
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their friends and relatives were exposed to the everyday violence of
war.”134
Pragasam explains that “[t]he Tamil diaspora was created in response to ethnonationalist policies of the Sri Lankan state—consequently, this is the frame though which
diaspora members perceive current events.”135 Pragasam concludes that experiences with
violence went beyond “a collection of brutal events” and formed “a psychological and
existentialist landscape of violence which forced individuals to reconfigure the very
manner in which they saw themselves”—experiences with violence “robbed them of their
sense of self and sense of ‘home’, sending them into a journey of ‘exile’ while still in Sri
Lanka itself.136 The very pursuit of “Eelam” (or separate Tamil statehood) by some
diaspora Tamils reflects a search for “something to believe in, a subjective belief that
shapes their own sense of identity, legitimacy as refugees from violence, coherence as a
‘nation-in-exile’ and reality as part of a wider transnational Tamil community, striving
for a sense of recognition, justice and dignity in the face of an oppressive ethnonationalist state.”137
Sri Lanka’s former Defense Secretary advised those pressing for accountability to
recognize that “past is past.”138 Yet, for many, including in the diaspora, the past is far
from past.139 Interestingly, diaspora narratives continue to be shaped by historic
134

Pragasam, supra note 106, at 84.
Id. at 170. For example, Pragasam recounts the story of “Raj” in London. Raj remains haunted by the
memory of witnessing an army unit enter his home and take his two elder brothers, who were never heard
from again. Although his family sent him abroad for his safety, Raj’s narrative frame was set. Id. at 82.
Another diaspora Tamil in London told Pragasam that his turning point came during the 1983 riots—he
went to bed a Sri Lankan and woke up a Tamil. Id. at 195. Tamil leader and former Supreme Court judge
C.V. Wigneswaran remarked: “The diaspora today still cannot forget the death, damage, destruction that
took place in 1983 because of which they had to leave Sri Lanka and go abroad.” Remembering Sri Lanka’s
Black July, BBC NEWS, Jul. 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23402727.
This collective framing is not unique to the Tamil diaspora experience. Hip hop artist Talib
Kweli remarked on black youth burning flags in Ferguson after the police shooting of an unarmed black
teen: “[I]t’s that frustration of knowing that you’re part of something [this country] that shuts you out, that
shuts you down, and attempts to treat you like you don’t exist.” Mid-Term Blues: Hip hop, race and
protests in Ferguson, BBC News, Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29573718
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
136
Pragasam, supra note 106, at 204.
137
Id., at 224-25; see also Grødum, supra note 115, at 148 (noting that common ideology among diaspora
Cambodians serves to help individuals within that community “feel a part of something in relation to a
bigger society”).
138
Interview by Al Jazeera with Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and Urban
Development, Apr. 22, 2010, available at http://www.defence.lk/videos/20100422_DecSecAl.wmv.
139
D.B.S. Jeyaraj,‘Black July’ 1983: Remembering the Horrors of a Pogrom, DBSJEYARAJ.COM (Jul. 24,
2012, 3:36 PM), http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/8439 (Every July after the 1983 pogrom, Sri Lankan
“security forces were geared up to face threats to the nation because the Tigers wanted to take revenge for
Black July…. This annual “black July” scare helped each year to divert focus away from the remembering
of the Black July 1983 pogrom against Tamils. Instead of letting the Nation recall this terrible act with
remorse, the spotlight on an imaginary threat from the LTTE and helped reverse roles.”) Against the Grain,
supra note 19, at 31, 36. (State recognition for the most emblematic events in Tamil consciousness has
135
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grievances like language polices, university admissions policies, and state sector hiring
polices even as ground realities change.140
This narrative is not the full story of Sri Lanka, nor the full story of the diverse
Tamil diaspora.141 In its quest to become the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils,
the LTTE killed moderate Tamil politicians and human rights defenders and eliminated
rival militant groups.142 Tamils in LTTE-controlled areas “were frightened to talk in
public spaces and as public people, for fear of being called a traitor and thus potentially
arrested, taxed, or murdered by the LTTE, or of being taken for LTTE by the Sri Lankan
army.”143 Many Tamils fled Sri Lanka to escape the LTTE’s reach only to find
themselves silenced within diaspora communities.144
been limited. Official apology for Black July came only in 2004—21 years after the event, following a
Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence. The Sri Lankan government began to rebuild the
Jaffna Public Library in 1997 but without local community involvement. When it reopened in 2003, the
state missed a key opportunity to apologize.)
140
For example, “Sinhala Only” policies of 1956 (enshrined in the 1972 Constitution) were scaled
back in the 1978 Constitution and Thirteenth Amendment of 1987 (yet to be fully implemented). See Silva,
supra note 123, at Ch. 7.
141
See Rajiva Wijesinha, Did Gotabhaya Precipitate the Crisis with Chris Nonis, Colombo Telegraph (Oct.
26, 2014), https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/did-gotabaya-precipitate-the-crisis-with-chrisnonis/ (“The head of military intelligence assured me that such [pro-LTTE] elements amounted to no more
than 7% of the diaspora, but he then had no answer to my question as to what we were doing about the
more than 90% whom we should have been winning over.”).
142
See, e.g. Letter from a Tamil in North-East Sri Lanka, Econ. & Pol. Wkly., (May 30, 2009) at 22, 2223 (“There were several people from the other organizations who gave their lives in the fight for the rights
of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. (The LTTE murdered many of them.) The LTTE dismissed them as traitors for
the only reason that they did not belong to their movement and asked the people to revere only the dead
LTTE cadres as ‘Great Heroes.’”); Kadirgamar, supra note 89, at 73 (“Over the last 25 years, the LTTE not
only scuttled every effort with the political process, it also eliminated other Tamil voices capable of taking
that process forward.”).
143
Thiranagama, supra note 128, at 72. Thiranagama makes an important point that scholars narrowly
focus on the LTTE in discussing Tamil militancy. The 1983 riots led to widespread recruitment into
EPRLF, EROS, PLOTE, TELO, and LTTE; the LTTE gained dominance in 1986, after proscribing its
rivals. As Thiranagama notes, “[t]he LTTE rise to supremacy saw 80-90 percent of those who had ‘risen
up’ against state discrimination imagining themselves freedom fighters [in rival militant groups] become
labeled potential Tamil traitors instead.” Id. at 189.
144
Id. at 74 (a Tamil in London “found that most diasporic Tamils were pro-LTTE and unwilling to listen
to her stories of LTTE-controlled Jaffna”); Banderage, supra note 133, at 116-17 (“As Tamil militant
groups monopolized the political space, members of the diaspora who were disinterested in communal
politics were persuaded, if not coerced into supporting separatism. Though living in democratic societies,
diaspora members found that they were not free to take independent positions on the Sri Lankan
situation.”); Interview with anonymous, (Oct. 29, 2014) (discussing Canadian Tamil who fled Sri Lanka
because of the LTTE and was asked to carry an LTTE flag in 2009 to protest the war); Samanth
Subramaniam, This Divided Island: Stories from the Sri Lankan War 77 (2014) (recounting the story of a
Canadian Tamil who served in the Sri Lankan Army in the 1980s and felt “doubly alienated by the war—
not only from the army but also from his own community”); Brun and Van Hear, supra note 43, at 61
(describing process by which the LTTE dominated over other Tamil voices in Sri Lanka and among the
diaspora). Indeed, the framing of a Sinhala versus Tamil conflict ignores major differences among Tamil
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Successive Sri Lankan governments have advanced their own narrative, reducing
the ethnic conflict to a war against terrorism. “Triumphalist in its successful ‘war on
terror,’ the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa refused to acknowledge, let
alone address, the Tamil minorities’ legitimate grievances against the state.”145 (The
former President proclaimed after the war that there were no longer any minorities in Sri
Lanka.146) Using discourse analysis of major public speeches after the LTTE’s defeat,
researcher Andi Schubert shows that the dominant state narrative “makes clear that over
the past 30 years Sri Lanka has had to grapple with a terrorist problem rather than an
ethnic conflict.”147 The government’s “discourse then seeks to affirm that this
outside/invader [the LTTE] is both the problem and the cause of conflict in Sri Lanka.
This is done through the flattening and simplification of the historical complexities of the
conflict in Sri Lanka and limiting the conflict to the time during which the LTTE was in
operation.”148
The government’s narrative must be understood through the psyche of fear and, as
with the diaspora narratives above, existential threat. Ethnic Sinhalese and other
communities lived in fear of LTTE suicide attacks, and army checkpoints became a
routine part of going to school, work, or shopping.149 Parents would take different routes
to reach the same destination so that if one parent died in an LTTE suicide blast, their
children would not become orphans.150 Car bombs, train bombs, bus bombs, airport
bombs, and checkpoints became the norm for civilians living outside the north and
east.151 As a 2011 Defense Ministry report put it:
The LTTE’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including the butchering
of children, and its targeting of places of religious worship, made it clear
that no one and nothing was safe from its violence. This placed
tremendous strain on ordinary life in Sri Lanka, causing incalculable
groups in Sri Lanka. See, e.g., Banderage, supra note 133, at 6 (highlighting significant differences,
including along caste lines, among northern Jaffna Tamils, eastern Batticoloa Tamils, hill country Indian
Tamils, and Colombo Tamils—and stating that the Tamil diaspora perspective largely reflects a northern
Jaffna Tamil voice).
145
Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, Int’l Crisis Group (Jul. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/209-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka-harder-thanever.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
146
V.K. Shashikumar, The Rajapaksa Model of Combatting Terror, Indian Defence Rev., Dec. 16, 2014,
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-rajapaksa-model-of-combating-terror.
147
Andi Schubert, Victorious Victims: An Analysis of Sri Lanka’s Post-War Reconciliation Discourse (Int’l
Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, Working Paper No. 6, Mar. 2013), at 16, available at
http://www.ices.lk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Victorious-Victims-PDF.pdf.
148
Id. at 8; see also Jayantha de Silva, How the LTTE Hoodwinked the International Community, Dec. 30,
2010, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090207_02 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
149
See, e.g., Anura Hegoda, Forgetting Ourselves, Daily News (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=features/forgetting-ourselves.
150
Id. (asking: “Do you remember the days when we said goodbye to loved ones in the morning not
knowing if either party would return home safely after work or attending school”); Interview with
anonymous (May 1, 2014).
151
See, e.g., Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis, supra note 3, ¶¶ 24-30.
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psychosocial harm to several generations of Sri Lankans of all ethnicities
and disrupting civilian life.152
A Sri Lankan citizen recalls feeling sheer panic in 2008 when a bus conductor in
Colombo picked up a parcel that none of the passengers claimed. Passengers pushed and
panicked to get off the bus, fearing a bus bomb. The parcel turned out to be an umbrella
that someone had left by mistake, but the sheer panic of that moment underscored the
collective trauma that many Sri Lankans felt.153 The end of the war came as a relief for
many Sri Lankans. Even those concerned about how the war was won hoped that its end
would bring an unprecedented era of peace and unity.154
There are still other narratives of violence and trauma in Sri Lanka. Muslims
have long been vulnerable, increasingly so in recent years. In 1990, the LTTE ethnically
cleansed Sri Lanka’s north of 80,000 Muslims.155 Norway’s omission of Muslims from
the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement has been described as a “basic design flaw.”156 Today,
Muslims again face persecution from militant Buddhist extremist groups.157 And in 1971
and the late 1980s, the Sri Lankan government brutally crushed JVP insurrections led by
economically marginalized Sinhalese youth. Their hands full with JVP insurrections in
the south and central parts of the country, the Sri Lankan government invited Indian
peacekeeping forces to deal with emerging Tamil militancy in the north. These Indian
troops committed widespread abuses against Tamil civilians, none of which have been
investigated or prosecuted. Each of these stories shapes Sri Lanka’s collective memories
of violence.

152

Id. at ¶ 30.
Interview with anonymous (Oct. 29, 2014).
154
See, e.g., Gananath Obeyesekere, Foreword to Sharika Thiranagama, In My Mother’s House: Civil War
in Sri Lanka, at xii (2011) (“[C]oncerns [about the fate of Tamil civilians] were overcome by the sheer
relief felt by the overwhelming majority of the people. One can now board a bus without fear of a bomb;
one can send children to school without being afraid of erratic suicide bomb attacks. The enshrouding fears
that wars produce seem to have been dispelled. It is this sense of relief, especially among the Sinhala
majority, that led to the feeling that any attempt to institute an investigation into possible violations of
human rights in effect would diminish the sense of having at last overcome the LTTE terror.”); see also
Arun Pillai-Essex, Tamil Diaspora in Post-War Sri Lanka, Groundviews (May 24, 2010),
http://groundviews.org/2010/05/24/tamil-diaspora-in-post-war-sri-lanka/. (Contrasting viewpoints among
diaspora Tamils and Sinhalese on what the military victory meant); Against the Grain, supra note 19, at 31,
36-37 (contrasting Tamil and Sinhalese “repositor[ies] of remembered violence”).
155
Devenesan Nesiah, Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in
October 1990 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.groundviews.org/2010/citizens-commission
(last accessed May 7, 2015).
156
See, e.g., Keenan, supra note 30, at 88-117.
157
See, e.g., Farah Mihlar, The State of Sri Lanka’s Muslims, Econ. & Pol. Wkly., (Sept. 19, 2009), at 2425 http://www.epw.in/commentary/state-sri-lankas-muslims.html; Kadirgamar, supra note 88 (describing
LTTE’s ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the North and massacres in the East); Sri Lanka Muslims Killed in
Aluthgama Clashes with Buddhists, BBC News, (June 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia27864716.
153
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“Reconciliation does not require writing a joint consensual history, but it may
require admitting the other’s truth into one’s own narrative.”158 This would be a tall
order in today’s polarized environment. At the same time, failing to acknowledge
different narratives—including those of one quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils who form the
diaspora—could lead to further destabilization, placing meaningful reconciliation further
from reach. Opening the door to competing narratives, including those that challenge the
single narrative of a “Humanitarian Operation” to defeat terrorism, could at least serve as
a starting place to come to terms with the past and explore hopes for a shared future.159
Post-war, despite the LLRC’s call for diaspora engagement, the Sri Lankan
government has failed to take any meaningful steps toward constructive engagement.160
More is needed for Sri Lanka to address its violent past and construct a shared future.
V.

Integrating Diaspora Narratives into a Transitional Justice Framework

Diaspora calls for accountability reflect the collective identities and traumas that
led one quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils to seek refuge abroad. The question then becomes
how diaspora narratives, including competing narratives within the Tamil diaspora, can
be incorporated into Sri Lanka’s transitional justice framework. This section outlines
some possibilities and challenges in formulating mechanisms for truth, redress, and
justice that reflect diaspora voices.
Since Mahinda Rajapaksa was voted out of office in January 2015, the
government of President Maithripala Sirisena has begun to make overtures to the
diaspora community. In a 2015 speech in Washington, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister
stated, “we have already unofficially spoken … to a section of the diaspora in how they
can engage in the process of rebuilding our country. I take this opportunity again to
invite the diaspora…all to come together to help Sri Lanka to move to a higher level of
excellence, which it has yet to achieve. So let’s all work together.”161 While positive,
such statements are forward-looking and do not acknowledge diaspora Tamils’ rights as
victims to truth and redress. This section attempts to fill that gap, while noting
challenges.
At the outset, any transitional justice framework must involve extensive
consultations and outreach with relevant stakeholders. Consultations occur during the
initial stages—through public workshops, focus groups, surveys, meetings, and release of
key documents, practitioners refine mandates, create buy-in and legitimacy, and ensure
158

Kelman, supra note 105, at 123.
See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 1, at 625 (“Accepting the premise that memory is highly contested in
post-conflict settings, there is no guarantee of one final collective memory, but rather there may be many
contested versions of the past.”).
160
See, e.g., Rajiva Wijesinha, To Daily News Pala on ‘With Friends like Wijesinha, President Didn’t Need
Enemies, Colombo Telegraph (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/to-dailynews-pala-on-with-friends-like-wijesinha-president-didnt-need-enemies (head of military intelligence
“admitted [to Wijesinha] that the LLRC, the action plan regarding which has been approved by Cabinet,
noted the need for a policy to win over the diaspora, but that nothing had been done about this”).
161
Mangala Samaraweera, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sri Lanka Foreign Minister,
Discussion on Sri Lanka after the Presidential Election (Feb. 11, 2015 1:19PM), available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/11/sri-lanka-after-presidential-election/i13p.
159
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that victims’ voices are heard.162 Outreach occurs throughout the life of the transitional
justice measure—through public hearings, media, and civil society outreach, practitioners
communicate findings and progress to the general public and affected communities.163
The Sri Lankan government should engage in close consultations and outreach with
diaspora Tamils in designing and implementing transitional justice measures to address
diverse diaspora narratives.164 This follows the LLRC’s recommendation that the
government create a multi-disciplinary task force to harness diaspora actors in the
reconciliation process.165
It is a valid question to ask whether diaspora communities are relevant
stakeholders: efforts to seek truth, promote redress, or pursue justice will require political
dialogue and compromise among those in Sri Lanka, including Tamil parties, other
political parties, victim communities in the former warzone, and Sri Lankan civil society
groups. Some might argue that while diaspora Tamils should contribute to Sri Lanka’s
transitional justice processes, they are not stakeholders in negotiations to define the
broader framework. By contrast, some diaspora Tamils might suggest that the diaspora
should play a prominent role in reaching a long-term political solution and negotiating
the overall framework for transitional justice.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to settle these complex issues, the goals
of each specific transitional justice project may help define the scope and limits of
diaspora engagement. At its core, transitional justice aims at a whole range of goals, both
individual and collective. At the individual level, transitional justice processes seek to
vindicate victims’ rights to truth, justice, and redress.166 Many diaspora Tamils are
victims, in a legal sense, with rights to truth and redress under international law. The
Basic Principles and Guidelines define “victims” as
persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial
impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that
162

Paige Arthur, Fear of the Future, Lived though the Past: Pursuing Transitional Justice in the Wake of
Ethnic Conflict, in Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies 271,
286 (Paige Arthur, ed., 2010).
163
Id.
164
See, e.g., Haider, supra note 73, at 226 (recommending consultations and outreach with diaspora
communities in designing and implementing transitional justice mechanisms).
165
LLRC Report, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 8.262, 8.265.
166
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of nonrecurrence, Pablo de Greiff, ¶ 54, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/46
(August 9, 2012) (hereinafter, “TJ Special Rapporteur Report”) (emphasizing “victim-centered approach”
to transitional justice); G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) (“hereinafter,
“Basic Principles and Guidelines”) (affirming victims’ rights to truth and reparations under international
law); First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, arts. 32-33, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(right of families to know the fate of their relatives and obligation of parties to search for those reported
missing); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on
States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) (affirming state obligations
under the ICCPR to investigate human rights obligations, provide redress, and bring perpetrators to
account).
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constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious
violations of international humanitarian law.167
Insofar as they fit this definition, diaspora Tamils should have standing as stakeholders to
shape processes for truth, justice, and redress for the harms they incurred.
However, transitional justice also aims at broader goals of reconciliation, nonrecurrence of violence, institutional reforms, and vetting and lustration of public officials,
which reinforce longer-term possibilities for peace.168 Other stakeholders may have a
stronger stake than diaspora Tamils to shape these broader objectives. It may be possible
to seek diaspora engagement for mechanisms that vindicate the rights of diaspora Tamils
as victims to the ethnic conflict, without seeking engagement on other transitional justice
processes.169
Another threshold question involves sequencing: given the many transitional
justice measures Sri Lanka will need to implement, initiatives to address historic
grievances of diaspora Tamils may be lower priority than outstanding issues from the last
stages of the war. Resettling internally displaced peoples (IDPs), identifying detainees
currently in custody, naming the disappeared, reforming the security apparatus, and
resolving land ownership claims may be more immediate concerns for Sirisena’s
administration.170 Moreover, transitional justice measures should not address diaspora
grievances at the expense of grievances among in-country Tamils, Muslims, or the
Sinhalese.
Finally, in charting a transitional justice course, the Sri Lankan government
should resist the urge to trade one measure of transitional justice for another—e.g., truth
at the expense of justice.171 As the ICTJ explains:
Without any truth-telling or reparation efforts, for example, punishing a
small number of perpetrators can be viewed as a form of political revenge.
167

Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 166, art. 8.
TJ Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 166, ¶ 28 (Transitional justice aims at “two mediate goals, i.e.
providing recognition to victims and fostering trust, and two final goals, i.e. contributing to reconciliation
and to strengthening the rule of law.”); see also Kristin van der Leest, Daniela Kolarova, & Laurie
Mercreant, A Capacity for Integrating Peacebuilding into Development, Initiative for Peacebuilding,43
(Dec. 2010), available at http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/1102PeaceDevelopment.pdf. (“A
transitional justice approach thus recognizes that there are two goals in dealing with a legacy of systematic
or massive abuse: 1. To gain some level of justice for victims. 2. To reinforce the possibilities for peace,
democracy, and reconciliation.”).
169
See e.g. Laura Young and Rosalyn Park, Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: Lessons from the
Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project, 3 Int’l J. of Transitional Justice 341, 345
(2009). The Liberian diaspora helped shape the diaspora component of that country’s truth and
reconciliation commission (see infra, Section V.A), without negotiating terms for the in-country TRC or
other transitional justice processes.
170
See, e.g., P. Krishnaswamy, Current Political Trend Signals Harmony Among Communities – M.A.
Sumanthiran MP, Sunday Observer (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2015/01/25/fea01.asp.
(TNA leader highlighted land rights, IDP resettlement, and detainee release as priority issues for Tamils in
Sri Lanka).
171
TJ Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 166.
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Truth-telling, in isolation from efforts to punish abusers and to make
institutional reforms, can be viewed as nothing more than words.
Reparations that are not linked to prosecutions or truth-telling may be
perceived as “blood money”—an attempt to buy the silence or
acquiescence of victims. Similarly, reforming institutions without any
attempt to satisfy victims’ legitimate expectations of justice, truth and
reparation is not only ineffective from the standpoint of accountability, but
unlikely to succeed in its own terms.172
Thus, in a transitional justice processes to advance truth, redress and accountability
should ideally proceed in parallel. As discussed below, each could incorporate a diaspora
component and vindicate the rights of diaspora Tamils to truth, justice, and redress.
A. Truth
Truth is a pillar of transitional justice: truth commissions, commissions of inquiry,
and fact-finding missions advance the right of individuals to fully investigate what
happened during the period of conflict and identify perpetrators and victims.
[I]f societies are to prevent recurrences of past atrocities and to cleanse
themselves of the corrosive enduring effects of massive injuries to
individuals and whole groups, societies must understand—at the deepest
possible levels—what occurred and why. In order to come fully to terms
with their brutal pasts, they must uncover, in precise detail, who did what
to whom, and why, and under whose orders.173
In Sri Lanka, emblematic events, including Black July, fail to register across
ethnic divides.174 It was not until 2001 that then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga
appointed a three-member truth commission to investigate ethnic violence between 1981
and 1984. The Commission failed to make any findings of prima facie culpability
against any individual or recommend specific prosecutions, and Kumaratunga’s public
apology in 2004 failed to identify those responsible or erase amnesties for 1980s-era
abuses.175 Although the Commission made several recommendations to promote national
172

What is Transitional Justice? Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJGlobal-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
173
Robert Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, in Truth v.
Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions 3, 3 (R. Rotberg and D. Thompson eds. 2010).
174
As one journalist recounts, “I was born ten years after Black July. I am a Singhalese. A week or so ago,
as the thirty-year anniversary approached, for curiosity’s sake, I did a small experiment. I asked some of
my peers a question: “What do you know about Black July?” Of twenty-two Sinhalese, eighteen did not
know what it was. I asked eight Tamil friends, all of whom knew, and had family experiences to share.”
Iraj de Alwis, Forgetting Black July, Groundviews, Jul. 31, 2013,
http://groundviews.org/2013/07/31/forgetting-black-july/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
175
Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, Apology to the Victims of Black Friday and the
Nation: The 21st Anniversary of Black July (Jun. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.presidentcbk.org/peace-speeches-11.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2015); Indemnity Act, No. 20
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healing and highlighted the lasting effect of violence in shaping Tamil collective identity,
Kumaratunga’s government failed to implement any recommendations, except issue
compensation in selected cases.176
Despite these shortcomings, during Kumaratunga’s presidency, diaspora Tamils
helped negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE and contributed substantial funds
to rebuild after the tsunami.177 Diaspora engagement during this period suggests that
while identities are shaped by the past, diaspora Tamils may be willing to constructively
engage with the government when transformation seems possible. By the same token,
when new abuses against Tamils occurred with impunity, past apologies appear negated,
with old wounds reopened.178
The Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence only covered the 19811984 period, and the LLRC only covered events after 2002. To date, no domestic
mechanism has comprehensively examined the root causes of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict,
which preceded the civil war. Similar to the Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence, the
LLRC did not identify perpetrators or acknowledge state responsibility beyond vague or
general expressions of remorse.179 Further, to date, no domestic commission has
systematically engaged diaspora Tamils.180
(1982) (Sri Lanka) (granting amnesty to all government agents for any act “legal or otherwise, done or
purported to be done with a view to restoring law and order”); Indemnity (Amendment) Act, No. 60 (1988)
(Sri Lanka) (extending the relevant period of indemnity to December 16, 1988); Report of the Presidential
Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-1984), printed as Sessional Paper No. III (Sept. 2002).
176
Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, Post-war Justice in Sri Lanka: Rule of Law, the Criminal Justice System and
Commissions of Inquiry, Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (2010), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/04234216454178AFC12576B20038FF61Full_Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Final Report of the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic
Violence (1981-1984), Ch. 5 (Sept. 2002).
177
, Baser, and Swain, supra note 85., at 681 (describing role of Tamil diaspora role in ceasefire
negotiations).
178
Anthropologist Sharika Thiranagama notes that for many Tamils in Sri Lanka, the past continues to
shape individuals’ expectations of the future. She concludes that “[u]ntil Tamils are more than secondclass citizens, individual ‘repair’ can always be undone.” Thiranagama, supra note 128, at 104-05.
Likewise, Elizabeth Jelin noted that among Peru’s indigenous communities, “new or recent forms of
suffering are remembered within the frameworks offered by their long-term memories and ways of life.”
Elizabeth Jelin, Silences, Visibility, and Agency: Ethnicity, Class, and Gender in Public Memorialization,
Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies 187, 196 (Paige Arthur,
ed., 2010); see also id. at 212 (“The way in which ‘short’ memories fit into ‘long’ memories of a group is
key to understanding identity dynamics…. [T]he short term is understood and placed into longer historical
time.”).
179
LLRC Report, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 8.152-8.164 (describing Tamil grievances in general historical terms,
without documenting specific facts or ascribing blame to particular state actors); see also When will they
get justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, Amnesty Int’l 12
(Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/info/ASA37/008/2011/en (last visited Jan.
26, 2015).
180
In 2008, the IIGEP Commission interviewed six at-risk witnesses living outside Sri Lanka by
videoconference, but President Rajapaksa suspended further interviews. See Twenty Years of Make
Believe: Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry, Amnesty Int’l 35-36 (Jun. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA37/005/2009/en (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). Besides IIGEP,
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With Sri Lanka’s defeat of the LTTE in 2009 and change in government in 2015,
the country has an opportunity to start a genuine truth-seeking process to come to terms
with the past. A comprehensive truth-seeking process would consider events that led to
the formation of Sri Lanka’s one-million-strong Tamil diaspora and collective traumas
and identities shaped by those events. The U.N. Principles on Impunity emphasize states’
duties toward victims and survivors to take measures “aimed at preserving the collective
memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of
revisionist and negationist arguments.”181 Truth-seeking processes should help “secur[e]
recognition of such parts of the truth as were formerly denied.”182 Consistent with these
obligations, a truth-seeking mechanism in Sri Lanka should aim to address the collective
identities and memories of diaspora Tamils.
The Sri Lankan government—as opposed to civil society, human rights groups, or
artists—stands in a unique position to facilitate such a truth-seeking process.
Government initiatives can mainstream recognition of collective traumas in a way that
civil society efforts cannot.183 Further, as the LLRC recognized: “the responsibility for
being the prime mover of [any reconciliation] process lies squarely with the
government.”184
Liberia may provide a helpful model for integrating diaspora Tamil narratives into
a truth-seeking process. Recognizing the role of the Liberian diaspora in starting and
fueling that country’s civil war, the 2006 Truth and Reconciliation Commission made
no commission of inquiry (including the LLRC) has solicited diaspora testimonies. See, e.g., Final Report
of the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-1984) 36 (Sept. 2002) (expressing
difficulty in investigating 1983 riots because “most of the victims are still living outside the country” and
Commission was limited to “the accounts of those who were able to give oral testimony”). IIGEP itself
only engaged with select witnesses in the diaspora, rather than engage systematically with the diaspora to
understand the root causes of conflict.
181
Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8,
2005) (Principle 3: The Duty to Preserve Memory).
182
Id. (Principle 6: The Establishment and Role of Truth Commissions).
183
“All the commemorative efforts surrounding the 1983 riots…currently attract those who, for the most
part, already share the ideals of the initiators of these efforts. If the riots of 1983 are to receive a fair and
effective reckoning, commemorative efforts must be mainstreamed, ideally with the support of the GoSL,
and include all ethnic communities in Sri Lanka as well as the Sri Lankan diaspora.” Sash Jayawardane, A
Study of Impunity in Post-Colonial Sri Lanka, Impunity Watch, 23 (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/Sri_Lanka_Research_Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). As
Jayawardane notes, several civil society organizations have attempted to commemorate emblematic events
in Sri Lanka’s past. For example, Voices for Reconciliation held workshops in 2013 with U.K.-based
diasporas to reach a more nuanced understanding of Black July. See Voices for Reconciliation,
Remembering the Riots, Groundviews, Aug. 12, 2013, http://groundviews.org/2013/08/12/rememberingthe-riots/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). The citizen-journalism site Groundviews released a commemorative
book in 2013 exploring Black July. See Black July, Groundviews, Sept. 7, 2013,
http://groundviews.org/2013/09/07/black-july-now-available-for-download-on-itunes/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2015). Likewise, in a book titled Incomplete Thombu, artist T. Shanaathanan exhibited floor plans,
drawings, and stories of 80 individuals from the north—Tamil and Muslim—who were displaced by the
conflict. T. Shanaathanan, The Incomplete Thombu (2011).
184
LLRC Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 8.149.
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efforts to systematically engage the fractured Liberian diaspora in its truth seeking
process.185 Commissioners signed a memorandum of understanding with a U.S.
organization (The Advocates), which collected over 1500 testimonies and conducted
hearings in eleven U.S. cities over a three-year period, in close consultation with Liberian
TRC Commissioners. This process gave diaspora members a chance to share stories, find
common ground, and contribute recommendations. In some cases, diaspora members
were unwilling to be in the same room together, but the TRC was able to document these
tensions formally and make recommendations for bridging divides.186
Sri Lanka could likewise hold sittings and collect testimonies from diaspora
Tamils in India, Canada, U.K. France, Germany, Australia, and the U.S. These
testimonies could aim to understand the causes of displacement and identify the (diverse)
needs and priorities of diaspora Tamils. This process would need to be part of a much
broader truth seeking mechanism within Sri Lanka, which would capture perspectives
from in-country Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims.
Truth commissions are typically grounded in victims’ rights to information and
redress. Accordingly, it is valid to question diaspora Tamils’ standing as victims to
participate in a truth-seeking process. In the Liberian example, diaspora participants
were either direct victims or indirect victims who had lost family members or
experienced other effects of the conflict.187 In this situation, diaspora Tamils certainly
have standing as direct or indirect victims to tell their own stories of loss or displacement
and seek truth about the underlying root causes. They may, however, lack standing to the
extent a truth-seeking process is narrowly focused on the last stages of the civil war.
A more difficult question is whether diaspora Tamils have standing to testify not
only about their individual stories of loss and trauma but also about the political ideology
with which they frame those harms. Put differently, it is an open question whether truth
commissions should apply an evenhanded human rights conception of victim/perpetrator
to witness testimony instead of a more politicized or contextualized understanding. Truth
commissions have their moral foundations in providing public recognition for victims, to
offer a space for them to tell their stories and thereby “reintegrate victims into the ‘speech
community’ and [] reinstate their right to speak, and especially to be listened to.”188 But
185

As the ICTJ noted, despite broad diaspora engagement, the Liberian TRC was plagued with other
weaknesses: “Many of the challenges the TRC faced in its operation, namely limited technical capacity,
poorly coordinated programming, and disharmony among its commissioners, are reflected in the
commission’s final report, which lacks evidentiary data, coherence between and within sections,
specificity, and the unanimous support of all commissioners, two of whom refused to endorse it.” Paul
James-Allen, Aaron Weah, and Lizzie Goodfriend, Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
Transitional Justice Options in Liberia, Int’l Ctr. For Transitional Justice 3 (May 2010), available at
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Liberia-Beyond-TRC-2010-English.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2015).
186
Young and Park, supra note 169, at 341.
187
Id. at 351. Likewise, in Cambodia, victims seeking civil party status before the ECCC were required to
show that their injuries (whether physical, material, or psychological) were directly linked to the charged
offenses. Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Rule 23(2) (2007).
188
Silvia Rodríguez Maeso, The Politics of Testimony and Recognition in the Guatemalan and Peruvian
Truth Commissions: The Figure of the ‘Subversive Indian’, 3 RCCS Annual Review 38, 61 (2011),
available at http://rccsar.revues.org/396?file=1 (last visited Feb. 26 2015).
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can a diaspora Tamil testify about Eelam or genocide, or glorify the LTTE, in narrating
his or her own story of loss? Some might say no.189
However, it may be best to recognize victims as persons with political agency (not
merely victims), without losing sight of guilt or responsibility.190 This point was made in
connection with Peru’s truth commission. By declaring neutral reparations for all victims
of armed conflict, some claimed that Peru’s truth commission (CVR) stripped historical
events of subjective context that would have revealed peasant self-defense groups as
political actors with both strengths and limitations, deserving of both praise and blame.191
The “lawfare” discussion would come full circle if diaspora Tamils were
permitted to speak but censored on what to say. Perhaps the best that a truth commission
can do is to aim at a representative sample through active outreach within diaspora
communities. Sincere efforts should be made to avoid privileging elites in seeking
diaspora narratives of conflict.
Sri Lanka has a long history of commissions of inquiry with little to show for it
(most reports remain unpublished).192 Many diaspora Tamils may view engagement with
new processes as a futile charade.193 Before embarking on another truth seeking process
(with or without diaspora involvement), the Sri Lankan government should release the
reports of past commissions and commit to a transparent and credible process. Departing
from failed commissions in the past, the government should ensure independence,
adequate resources, subpoena power, and witness protection for any truth-seeking
process. In addition, the terms of reference and mandate for any commission “should be
based upon broad public consultations in which the views of victims and survivors
189

Anthropologist David Stoll famously criticized Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú’s narrative
of state violence in Guatemala, stating that as a former militant, Menchú “believed in the ideology and used
it to frame the experience of her family and people.” Interview of David Stoll by Dina Fernandez-Garcia,
Stoll: “I Don’t Seek to Destroy Menchú,” in The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy 67 (Arturo Arias and
David Stoll eds. 2001). The South African TRC selected victims for public testimony across multiple
racial and political dimensions, “writing-out” race in order “to valorize a human rights’ conception of
victimhood instead of heroic resistance.” Madeleine Fullard and Nicky Rousseau, Truth Telling, Identities,
and Power in South Africa and Guatemala, in Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice
in Divided Societies 54, 74 (Paige Arthur, ed., 2010).
190
Maeso, supra note 188, at 61-64.
191
Jemima Garcia-Godos, Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and the Challenge of
Historical Interpretation, 2 Int’l J. Transitional Justice 63, 82 (2008). See also Id. at 77, 79 (“The
problem is that in the process of identifying these ideal victim-subjects, any seemingly distractive features
of the actors, such as political membership and behavior, are washed away.” “The attempt to create
empathy for and among victims should not deprive them of their agency.”).
192
See Twenty Years of Make Believe, supra note 180; A List of Commissions and Committees Appointed
by GoSL (2006-Nov. 2013), CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES (Jan. 9, 2014), available at
http://www.cpalanka.org/a-list-of-commissions-and-committees-appointed-by-gosl-2006-2013/ (last visited
Jan. 20, 2015); Pinto-Jayawardena, supra note 176.
193
For example, Dr. Manoharan, the father of a Tamil student killed in Trincomalee in 2006, saw the
LLRC as a charade: he had already testified before a 2006 commission of inquiry, and he wanted the report
made public before he could trust another domestic mechanism. Yolanda Foster, Quo vadis Sri Lanka?,
Groundviews, May 18, 2014, http://groundviews.org/2014/05/18/quo-vadis-sri-lanka/ (last visited Jan. 28,
2015).
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especially are sought.”194 These efforts would help build trust and facilitate constructive
engagement with diaspora and in-country Tamils alike.
Incorporating diaspora narratives in truth-seeking processes would be nothing
short of a sea change. Under former President Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan government
marginalized diaspora Tamils as the “LTTE rump.” Long term, diaspora narratives could
help challenge the single narrative of the ethnic conflict. Diaspora Tamil narratives of
discrimination could be situated against Sinhalese narratives of fear and Muslim
narratives of displacement. Diverse narratives from within the diaspora community could
debunk the notion that the Tamil diaspora is uniformly pro-LTTE.
B. Reparations
Reparations programs seek to redress past harms and ensure that harms will not
recur.195 Reparations can include monetary compensation, return of land or property,
official apologies, museums, memorials, education programs, psychological support, and
creating days of commemoration. A carefully designed reparations program could
attempt to incorporate diaspora perspectives of the conflict.
To date, only a handful of those affected by the civil war have received
compensation from the government.196 The Sri Lankan government has not erected any
public memorials to commemorate the 1983 riots or held any other emblematic events in
the protracted ethnic conflict. Nor are such events discussed in history textbooks issued
by the Ministry of Education.197 By contrast, although reparations are severely lacking
for Sinhalese victims of the JVP insurrections, the government did erect a memorial in

194

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, supra note 181 (Principle 6).
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) (“Van Boven/Bassiouni
Principles,” defining victims’ rights to remedy, including compensation, restitution, rehabilitation,
satisfaction, and guarantees of non-recurrence, fore breaches of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law).
196
In 2004, President Kumaratunga authorized compensation for 937 individuals who testified before the
Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence about events that occurred between 1981 and 1984.
This number pales in comparison to the number of Tamils who fled the island—one quarter of the total
population, numbering one million today.
197
Jayawardane, supra note 183, at 22; see also Sanjayan Rajasingham, Being a New Sri Lanka-2, Jan. 30,
2015, http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/37916#more-37916 (last visited Feb. 26, 2015) (“Shortly after
finishing my ‘O’ Level exams in 2006, I realized how little I was taught about post-independence Sri
Lanka’s history. My textbooks had nothing to say about Rohana Wijeweera and the two JVP insurrections,
let alone why they came about. They had nothing to say about SJV Chelvanayakam, about the ethnic riots
of ’58, ’77, ’81 and ’83, or about the Banda-Chelva and Dudley-Chelva pacts. Whatever the reason these
(and other) events were excluded, it meant that many of my generation knew nothing about them. Or, they
only knew those parts that were passed on within their communities.”).
195
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1997 for 33 students abducted and killed in Embilipitiya in the late 1980s.198 Without
question, more could be done to redress victims on all sides of the ethnic conflict.
In designing reparations programs, the Sri Lankan government could evaluate
ways to recognize collective memories and redress collective harms of diaspora Tamils.
For example, museums, memorials, and commemorations could explore root causes of
displacement and violence and acknowledge state and LTTE responsibility for past
harms. Museums and memorials, however, should be careful to recognize past harms
“in a way that does not demean the dignity of other groups” or “foment a sort of tit-for-tat
escalation of competing symbols in the public sphere—which may reinforce a sense of
group threat.”199 Careful curation could not only recognize collective traumas among
diaspora Tamils but also break down monolithic notions of ethnicity.200
Symbolic reparations might also track cultural notions of identity and loss, in
particular, the longing for sonta ūr (ancestral village).201 Post-war, some diaspora Tamils
have journeyed back to their sonta ūr; these “homecoming” journeys are emotional but
potentially restorative and worth encouraging.202 One potential challenge is that complex
198

The ‘Shrine for the Innocent’ was built in 1997 but removed in 2012 by the Urban Development
Authority (implicating then-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Gotabhaya
Rajapaksa). See Written statement submitted by the International Movement Against All Forms of
Discrimination and Racism (IMADR), page 4, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/NGO/123 (Feb. 14, 2012).
199
Paige Arthur, Fear of the Future, Lived though the Past, supra note 162, at 291-92.
200
For example, exhibits could profile Sinhalese individuals who protected their Tamil neighbors; diaspora
Tamils who fled the LTTE; and the psychological effects of displacement and war across ethnic divides.
201
Researchers have noted the central role of sonta ūr (ancestral village) in shaping Tamil identity. E.
Valentine Daniel, Fluid Signs: Being a Person the Tamil Way 63 (1987) (“One of the most important
relationships to a Tamil is that which exists between a person and the soil of his ūr.”); Thiranagama, supra
note 128, at 151 (“[U]r—translatable most properly as home or natal village—is one of the most ordinary
(thus evocative) words in colloquial Tamil. For the refugees, ur is an often-used Tamil word. It evokes an
everyday emotive language of expectation, love, and sentiment. For those I worked with, because one is a
person, one has an ur, and because one has an ur, one must either love it or feel obliged to love it.”).
Diaspora Tamils (like northern Muslims), displaced by decades of war, express a longing for ūr—as one
U.K. Tamil stated: I used to think about walking the streets of Jaffna, to my house, all the time. I used to
think that it would be the happiest moment for me – it would be a wonderful day. It would mean that the
situation would have changed politically. It would represent more than a homecoming, it would mean a
resuscitation of the community. Interview of Narmada Thiranagama, No More Tears Sister: Anatomy of
Hope and Betrayal (Jun. 27, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/pov/nomoretears/update_narmada.php (last visited
Jan. 26, 2015). Likewise, journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj, who returned to Sri Lanka after 25 years in exile,
stated: “The hope of return is always there. It is this hope that sustains a person in exile living away from
the mother country.” See Marianne David, D.B.S. Jeyaraj’s journey home, Daily FT, Feb. 26, 2014,
http://www.ft.lk/2014/02/26/d-b-s-jeyarajs-journey-home/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). It should be noted
that ūr, or home, is a distinct construct from ‘homeland’: ūr evokes an imagined past, an identity based on
place that crosses ethnic divides. Thiranagama, supra note 128, at 152. This characteristic may render the
concept of ūr a less contentious site for commemoration and social memory than homeland (e.g., Eelam).
202
One U.S.-based Tamil expressed a profound sense of healing upon her return to Jaffna after
thirty years—having left at the age of 16 and returned at age 46, she felt healed when members of her
church recognized and embraced her. In subsequent visits, she has taken two aunts with her to see their
former homes and villages; although her aunts were initially reluctant to go, both visits were emotional and
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land rights issues could emerge, given decades of displacement. Symbolic efforts
directed solely at diaspora Tamils could also leave internally displaced Muslims feeling
more marginalized. As the ICTJ notes, tackling politically charged issues such as
overlapping or competing land claims can lead to renewed tensions.203 Still, failing to
address property and land issues could lead to further conflict,204 and symbolic
homecoming efforts could help address collective traumas (across communities) formed
by displacement and exile.
Reparations not only redress past harm, “they also have a forward-looking goal of
helping to rebuild society by affirming the status of victims as equal citizens in a new
order that aspires to be not only more peaceful but also more legitimate, more
democratic, more inclusive.”205 Yet, in seeking parity of status, reparations programs
should consider whether to recognize the political agency of victim groups. “[A]
reparations project inspired by a desire to give victims recognition as equal citizens
cannot systematically disregard the fact that different groups among the population might
have a different experience of the violence.”206 Reparations programs structured to
redress all victims of ethnic conflict, irrespective of ethnicity, political persuasion, or role
in the war, may strip historical events of subjective context and fail to challenge the
single narrative of conflict.207 At the same time, memorials and commemorations that
consider victims as political actors should avoid privileging elite voices (or certain
political viewpoints) within diaspora communities.
Ultimately, any effort at memorialization or symbolic redress would reflect a
significant change in diaspora engagement for the Sri Lankan government. Last year,
the Rajapaksa administration banned foreign passport holders from travel to the north and
proscribed 424 individuals and 16 Tamil organizations as “terrorism” financers.208 These
measures, taken years after the war’s end, should be reversed to credibly engage diaspora
Tamils in any transitional justice process. Early signs under President Sirisena are
promising—days after the January 2015 elections, the new government scrapped the
foreign travel ban, and its External Affairs Minister stated: “I have met some of the
people in London whose groups were banned by the earlier government. I do not believe

transformative for all involved. Peace activist Ashima Kaul, a displaced Hindu from Kashmir, India,
likewise speaks of personal healing in traveling back to Kashmir—when a Muslim imam greeted her and
welcomed her to her natal home, she felt decades of pain erase. Interview with anonymous (Oct. 31,
2014).
203
Transitional Justice and Displacement: Challenges and Recommendations, Int’l Ctr. For Transitional
Justice 8 (Jun. 2012), http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ%20and%20BrookingsLSE%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Displacement%20Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
204
Id.
205
Ruth Rubio-Martin, Claudia Paz y Paz, and Julie Guillerot, Indigenous Peoples and Claims for
Reparation: Tentative Steps in Peru and Guatemala, in Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional
Justice in Divided Societies 17, 18 (Paige Arthur ed., 2010).
206
Id. at 22.
207
Garcia-Godos, supra note 191, at 82 (discussing missed opportunities in Peruvian context); Krystalli,
supra note 111 (challenging the single narrative of conflict).
208
Prior approval for foreign nationals visiting the north, supra note 65; Gazette No. 1854/41, supra note
64.
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that they are terrorists.”209 However, proscriptions on specific diaspora groups and
individuals currently remain in place.
C. Justice
Justice processes hold perpetrators individually accountable for serious violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law, ensuring that those accused are tried
in accordance with due process. It has been suggested that criminal accountability also
promotes reconciliation, by shifting blame from whole groups to individual
perpetrators.210 In addition, trials may provide critical space to recognize and incorporate
competing narratives of conflict, including diaspora Tamil narratives.
Few studies discuss the impact of collective memories on criminal trials.211 Trials
provide “a privileged site for conflicting accounts:” a courtroom can serve as a “‘theater
of ideas,’ where large questions of collective memory and even national identity are
engaged.”212 Ultimately, it may not be possible for criminal trials to “settle disputes
about historical interpretation of recent events,” but trials may “go a long way in settling
the factual basis of some events, so that discussions can then proceed over a shared
understanding of what actually happened.”213
Emblematic cases of violence against Tamils linger in collective memories and
continue to shape diaspora views of the Sri Lankan state.214 Impunity likewise shapes
collective memories. Entrenched impunity has led many diaspora Tamils to lose trust in
the state’s ability to provide justice, leading them to seek accountability in the
international sphere.215
The shared nature of memories and collective histories could prove helpful in
developing justice mechanisms. In contrast to truth commissions, criminal prosecutions
consider a limited number of events, which may not reflect the full scope of harms
perpetrated or experienced. The few victims who are eligible to participate in criminal
trials play supporting roles as witnesses, and they must limit their testimonies to the
209
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offenses charged.216 However, criminal convictions have the potential to vindicate harms
beyond those alleged in any specific case. In the same way that impunity for emblematic
cases shapes diaspora views, convictions of “big fish” for these emblematic cases may
symbolically vindicate broader collective and individual memories of violence.217 The
Sri Lankan government could investigate and prosecute state actors, paramilitaries, and
LTTE leaders alleged to be most responsible for emblematic human rights abuses on all
sides of the ethnic conflict.218 In cases where perpetrators are no longer alive, the state
could publicly release archival evidence in its custody, issue apologies, and make
reparations to victims who can establish a claim.
The Sri Lankan government could start by creating an independent institution,
with powers akin to those of a special prosecutor, to investigate emblematic cases on all
sides of the ethnic conflict. Past domestic commissions made this recommendation.
Noting structural barriers to accountability, including conflicts of interest within the
Attorney General’s department, the 1994 and 1998 Disappearances Commissions called
for the creation of an “Independent Human Rights Prosecutor” in Sri Lanka, funded by
Parliament and given the same independence as the elections commissioner.219 The
LLRC likewise recommended an “independent institution” to address grievances “arising
out of any executive or administrative act, particularly those based on ethnicity or
religion.”220
If created, the Sri Lankan government should grant such an institution broad
independence and subpoena powers to investigate and prosecute historic crimes. The
special prosecutor could start by investigating perpetrators identified by past
commissions of inquiry.221 In seeking justice for diaspora Tamils, the independent
prosecutor could prosecute historic cases alongside more recent abuses. The independent
216
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prosecutor could also engage directly with diaspora communities to investigate
emblematic human rights cases. For example, the office could set up a Victim’s Unit,
similar to the one of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),222
with a diaspora liaison who could receive evidence from victims and witnesses within
diaspora communities.
To prosecute historic crimes, blanket amnesties may need to be revisited. Under
the Indemnity Laws currently in place, state officials and security forces are immune
from any legal proceeding (civil or criminal) for actions “legal or otherwise” taken
between August 1977 and December 1988 “with a view to restoring law and order,” if
“done in good faith” by or at the direction of a Minister, Deputy Minister, or public
servant.223 Likewise, the Prevention of Terrorism Act shields security personnel from
civil or criminal liability for arbitrary detentions and other actions purported to be taken
“in good faith” pursuant to the Act.224 These statutes were enacted to retroactively
immunize all state actors from liability for unlawful conduct. When enacted, these
provisions were inconsistent with Sri Lanka’s then-existing obligations under
international law to provide victims with “effective remedy,” including “the possibilities
of judicial remedy.”225 Today, these blanket amnesties for torture and gross human rights
violations are invalid under international law.226 An independent prosecutor could
therefore argue that existing amnesty laws do not preclude prosecution of historic
crimes.227
Criminal trials, whether historic or recent, always carry political implications.
Decisions about who to prosecute and for what crimes may be perceived as politically
222
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motivated.228 In the case of Sri Lanka, prosecuting Army killings of surrendering LTTE
cadres in 2009 may be received as more political than prosecutions for the denial of
humanitarian aid or shelling of civilian targets. Likewise, a decision to prosecute crimes
against one community could be perceived as a whitewash of crimes committed against
another. To complicate matters, cases that are easier to establish in terms of liability
evidence may be less politically palatable. Resource constraints may require an
independent prosecutor to make difficult choices about whether to first prosecute a
member of the Army or the LTTE, and whether to prioritize historic versus more recent
crimes.
While there are no easy answers, it is worth considering how justice mechanisms
in Sri Lanka could incorporate a diaspora component. Prosecuting historic cases, for
example, might provide diaspora Tamils with acknowledgement and recourse after
decades of impunity.
VI.

Conclusion

Since the end of the civil war in May 2009, diaspora Tamils have been vocal
proponents for accountability. Some might label certain forms of diaspora advocacy as
“lawfare” or “long-distance nationalism,” but such labels fail to account for the complex
memories and history that may shape diaspora perspectives. This article steps back to
consider whether diaspora Tamil voices for accountability differ from mainstream human
rights groups; why these differences may exist; and how diaspora voices might be
incorporated within an inclusive transitional justice framework for Sri Lanka.
With the change in government in January 2015, Sri Lanka has an opportunity to
constructively engage with diaspora Tamils in formulating a transitional justice
framework. Diaspora narratives could be solicited in truth commissions, and symbolic
reparations could seek to provide redress for shared memories of violence,
marginalization, and exile. Criminal trials could prosecute historic abuses alongside
more recent crimes, providing victims in the diaspora with recourse after decades of
impunity. While this article does not recommend a particular course of action, there may
be several ways in which the Sri Lankan government could seek to incorporate diverse
diaspora narratives within an inclusive transitional justice framework for truth, redress,
and justice.
Doing so may present challenges. One challenge is incorporating diaspora
narratives without privileging diaspora elites: those who fled the LTTE may offer
different narratives of conflict from those sympathetic to the LTTE. Another deals with
political aspects of diaspora engagement: in opening the door to diaspora narratives, it is
not clear to what extent political views among diaspora Tamils regarding “genocide” or
“Eelam” (statehood) should form part of the discussion. Also, at a macro level, diaspora
engagement may be lower priority among Sri Lanka’s many transitional justice
challenges.
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Even so, the recent change in government presents a historic opportunity for Sri
Lanka to come to terms with the past. Irrespective of sequencing and prioritization,
diaspora engagement will need to be part Sri Lanka’s effort to come to terms with the
past and look to a shared future. As Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission recognized, failing to engage diaspora groups altogether could risk further
polarization and put meaningful reconciliation farther from reach.229
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